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Abstract
LISA COURTNEY FOX: Within and Without: Identity and Immigration
in Contemporary European Politics.
(Under the direction of Liesbet Hooghe.)
How do feelings of national identity shape the attitudes of Western Europeans to-
ward immigrants and immigration policy? The three empirical studies presented in
this dissertation explore this question.
The first study develops a typology of national identities and maps them onto the
commonly-used left-right dimension of political positionality. Then, by using each
type in a multivariate regression analysis, I show that each the identity types have
a differential impact on attitudes toward immigrant groups and immigration policy.
Finally, I also show that the salience of each type of identity varies between countries
in Western Europe. This analysis uses the large-N, cross-national survey data from
thirteen Western European countries polled by the International Social Survey Program
in 2003. The results provide insight into reason why debates about national identity
and sovereignty are almost entirely absent in some Western European countries political
discourse, while hotly contested in others.
In the second study, the Netherlands is taken as a critical case study in the develop-
ment of anti-immigrant attitudes. The data for this paper was drawn from two surveys,
administered ten years apart: one administered in 1998 with the aid of the University
of Utrecht, and my own survey in 2007. The shocking events that took place in the
Netherlands during this decade were connected to the immigrant community either
tangentially or directly. These unforeseeable events presented a natural experiment,
making it possible to infer the impact of these events on attitudes toward immigrants.
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I show that negative attitudes toward Muslims increased significantly between the two
surveys.
The third paper adds an explicitly political dimension to the analysis of anti-
immigrant sentiment. Using a multi-level model, I examine the relationship between
strength of party cue and anti-immigrant sentiment. There is significant variation at
the party level on this issue. The results show that political parties on the right have
more coherent positions on immigration than parties on the left, and that the rela-
tionship between party cues and anti-immigrant sentiment is strong and significant:
political cues do impact individual attitudes on this issue.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
How do feelings of national identity shape the attitudes of Western Europeans toward
immigrants and immigration policy? The three empirical studies presented in this
dissertation explore this question.
Over the course of building these theory-building projects, it has become clear
that the formulation of a clear and precise definition of identity poses a difficult yet
fundamentally important challenge. The persistent instability of this concept has led
some scholars to the misguided conclusion that it should be modified or abandoned
altogether. As we seek to understand political attitudes, however, the notion of identity
reappears time and again.
The following three studies probe the original question on three different dimensions.
Each dimension carries its own epistemic lineage; each contains a dialogue on the
meaning of identity which rarely engages the other two traditions. And yet they all
find themselves confronted by the same questions. How does one come to have feelings
of identity–of sameness and commonality–with a particular group of people? How has
the imaginary community of the nation come to be a constituent and consistent part of
individual identity? Is national identity distinct from other forms of identity, and if so,
how? The inherently political nature of national identity raises the questions of how,
and by whom, the boundaries of the national community are defined. Finally, how does
this fit into the history and political institutions of Western European nations in the
present day?
Each one of these questions has produced voluminous research and distinct fields of
inquiry: identity theory, social identity theory, nationalism, immigration and migration
studies, and a wide variety of analyses of European politics. I will not attempt to
provide a comprehensive summary of the literature in each of these fields, but rather to
show the essential connections between these theories and the ways I have approached
this particular puzzle.
Theories of Identity
In their critical review of identity as a conceptual tool in social scientific analysis,
Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue that the term identity has been used to represent a
variety of concepts: identity as self-understanding and distinction; identity as a feeling
of being a member of a community; identity as core, essential selfhood and identity as
constructed, fragmented, and decidedly non-essential. Even advocates for the use of
identity acknowledge that a state of definitional anarchy exists (Abdelal et al. 2006:
695). I argue that identities can be more clearly theorized by specifying their form,
function, situation, and salience. Form can be used to describe both how an identity is
formed as well as to specify the types of identity. Function is a way to understand the
active part of an identity. Situation refers to the location of an identity in time: the
ways in which identity is made possible by a particular set of historical and cultural
circumstances. Salience is the process whereby an identity becomes important and
influences cognition. Each of the papers in this thesis approaches the relationship
between identity and attitudes toward immigration from a different perspective. Using
the rubric above, the first paper considers the question from the angle of form: can
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a clear conceptualization and measurement of identity types reveal interesting cross-
national and cross-typical differences? The second paper can be seen as addressing
questions of situation and salience by looking at the rising importance of national
identity in the Dutch context due to a specific concatenation of events. The third paper
examines anti-immigrant sentiment in the context of partisan political competition; this
can be seen as both form (parties shaping attitudes) and function (whether this works
well as a way to distinguish parties from one another).
Identity is a mode of perception that determines how one sees the world, what one
considers important or relevant, and what is considered appropriate behavior. This
mode of perception is formed through an ongoing process of socialization, whereby each
person comes to understand the roles that are available to them, the behavior associated
with those roles in particular situations, and the consequences of stepping outside the
boundaries of acceptable behavior. In terms of the political life of a society, this process
of socialization influencessometimes in contradictory waysour ideas of citizenship and
its associated responsibilities (Conover, Crewe and Searing 2009). Change over time
in any given society is especially notable in terms of social categories, which alter
markedly over timewhich categories are relevant, who belongs to them, and what is
expected of members of those groups. Though each individual is formed by the society
into which she was born, not all individuals will conform to social expectations. They
may develop a self-conception which is at odds with the larger society, and behave
differently because of it. If others begin to do the same, this will aggregate over time to
change the common-sensical understanding of the whole societyand in turn, this new
social framework will be communicated to the next generation, setting the parameters
of the next round of social change (Durkheim 1895; Foucault 1977 ).1
1Though the original genesis of this conception of social change was rooted in biology rather than
sociology. I was thinking about the way DNA replicates through making copies of itself; over the course
of countless copies some mistakes are mademutations of the genome. These mutations, if successful
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So identity—self-conception and worldview—is the connection between the micro-
level of individual belief and behavior and the macro-level of social/cultural and political
institutions. Erik Erikson, the progenitor of recent identity studies, gracefully described
identity as “a process located in the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his
communal culture, a process which establishes the identity of these two identities”(1968:
22; italics in the original). No individual ever perfectly identifies (in the sense that
identity also means to become one with, or to make the same as) with her society,
and that mismatch between individual will and social convention is what makes social
change not only possible but inevitable.
Yet this processional movement between individual and society is still not well
understood. Linking the detailed, personal information gathered at the individual
level with the aggregate, averaged information of the societal level is difficult. Social
identity theory concerns itself with this intersecting level between individual and group.
Through minimal group experiments, Henri Tajfel and his collaborators discerned some
fundamental human needs: first, that individuals wish to think well of themselves,
and that they also wish to distinguish themselves from others (Tajfel 1970; Billig and
Tajfel 1973; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1986). These two desires drive
individuals to identify with a group quickly, the authors believed, because positive
evaluations of the group translate to positive evaluations of oneself, and self-worth is
also derived from the status of the in-group relative to other groups (Turner et al.
1987). In social identity theory, the presence of other groups is assumed, because
groups only exist in relationship with (and in comparison to) other groups. Other
groups are usually judged to be inferior to ones own group in some way (in order to
protect the positive self-evaluation gained through group membership). More recent
(i.e. proving an evolutionary advantage in some way), go on to spread throughout a population. It
seems to me that concepts, or theories, work the same way.
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work has suggested, though, that in-group identification does not inevitably result in
or rely upon the derogation of other groups (Brewer 1999; Brewer and Pierce 2005).
The minimal group experiments created group identity without affect. The groups
had no particular history, no narrative framework, no meaningful symbols, and so on.
The question is: when is a group just a group? And when is it something more? Is an
identity that is political in origin and functionsuch as national identitysomehow distinct
from other collective understandings based on ethnicity, occupation, or religion? As
national narratives emerge, do people simply expand affective attachment from smaller,
kinship-based groups to the larger, more abstract group?
The National as Natural
Eric Hobsbawm (1992) argued that the construction of national identities was a de-
liberate action on the part of the ruling classes. As liberal democratic movements
became widespread, conceptions of legitimate authority were changing; legitimacy was
beginning to be understood as a function of popular consent. Hobsbawm theorized
that the ruling classes invented a national mythology, popularized it and standardized
it through state institutions such as the bureaucracy and the educational system, and
thereby maintained their power. Hobsbawm has a convincing argument, yet the decon-
struction of a process of building national identities is unsatisfying, since it still cannot
show how individuals come to internalize these identities so thoroughly. In short, is
it possible to differentiate between a bowling league and a nation-state as a source of
identity?
One way in which national identity may be seen as distinct from other social clas-
sifications is through its association with force. Weber classically defined the state as
that entity which has a monopoly on legitimate violence within its territorial borders.
Bourdieu (1985) later expanded Weber’s definition to include symbolic force. The state
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has an effective monopoly on legitimate classifications,2 and it may force recognition
of those classifications by any or all members of the society. Therefore it could be said
that national identity is a forceful identity in more ways than one, and in a way that
other identities are not.
Political struggle is defined by this “inextricably theoretical and practical struggle
for the power to conserve or transform the social world by conserving or transforming
the categories through which it is perceived” (Bourdieu 1985: 729). Symbolic force
begins with the classification and naming of groupsa forceful act, imposing divisions.
For Bourdieu, the ultimate aim of politics is the acquisition of enough power (social
and economic capital) to name and classify with authority. The political identities that
emerge from this struggle over categories are “among the most normatively significant
and behaviorally consequential aspects of politics” (R. Smith 2004: 303). When a
politician is talking about the nation, he is speaking of it as a timeless, natural entity,
yet his speech is itself part of the ongoing political struggle over the meaning and
boundaries that define the nation.
To return to the question raised by Hobsbawm’s work above, why do people identify
with the imagined community (Anderson 1991) of the nation? National identity may
function as any generic group identity would: as a source of differentiation, self-worth,
and status. National identities give a sense of belonging to a community that existed
prior to ones birth and which will, one imagines, persist after ones death. Though what
it means to be Dutch or American changes over time, the power of the national myth
(or the strength of the national identity) is measured by the degree to which Dutch-ness
or American-ness seems immutable and natural.
2It should be noted that there is a categorical overlap between the imagined community of the
nation and the institutional structure of the state. When someone identifies as an American one is
not identifying with the Department of Motor Vehicles. Yet the institutions of the state support and
perpetuate classification schemes that determine identity, which in turn shapes the ways in which one
may appeal to the state for redress (opportunity structures).
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Identities of Interest: Contemporary Europe
Elections in the European Union (EU) have been marked by the continuing emphasis
on immigration and national sovereignty. This has primarily benefited parties of the
right, and, in particular, those parties that are usually labeled the “far-right.”3 In
the most recent European Parliamentary (EP) elections (2009), several anti-EU, anti-
immigration parties significantly increased their vote share compared to the last EP
election (in 2004). The Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) won 17% of the vote from the
Netherlands; the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO¨) garnered 17.7% of the vote, which
was double that of the previous election; the Danish Peoples Party (DF) also doubled
their previous vote share, winning 14% of the vote. These parties have renewed the idea
of each nation as a historically unique community, one which is currently threatened by
outsiders (immigrants and the EU) The success of these parties, at both domestic and
European levels of government, illustrates that national identities still retain emotional
resonance and relevance.
Upon the victory of the PVV in a local election last March,4 Geert Wilders—the
party’s leader and one of the most controversial political actors in the Netherlands—
proclaimed:
“ We are going to be the biggest party in the country. . . The leftist elite still
believes in multiculturalism, coddling criminals, a European super-state and
high taxes. But the rest of the Netherlands thinks differently. That silent
3This categorization, frequently repeated not only in the popular press but occasionally in academic
work as well, neglects the differences between parties on the right. Most importantly, the parties that
are gaining ground in European politics are populist in orientation, not authoritarian/fascist. The new
populist-right parties combine tough anti-crime messages with a moderately pro-welfare state position,
which cuts across traditional cleavages nicely and thereby broadens their appeal. Finally, both the
DF and the PVV take strongly pro-Israel stances, which stands in marked contrast to the explicitly
anti-Semitic view of older right-wing parties such as the Front National.
4The elections for local councils were held on March 3, 2010.
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majority now has a voice.”5
This quote nicely encapsulates many of the main themes of the populist right, an anti-
elitist position that links multiculturalism (immigrants) to crime (immigrants who are
criminals) to the European superstate (more elitists) in rapid succession. In the general
elections in June, the PVV received the third-largest share of votes (15.5%) and gained
an astonishing 15 seats over the last election, giving the PVV a total of 24 seats,6 and
putting them in the position of kingmaker.7
National identity is likely to continue to be a catalytic issue in European poli-
tics. The current economic crisis, if prolonged, will exacerbate tensions over national
sovereignty, throw into sharp relief the disparities of wealth and resources among the
member states, and stiffen resistance to further integration of the European Union.
Identity is an issue that works for political parties at a time when not much else will;
though they may be powerless over many of the forces at work in the global economy,
they can give meaning to and mobilize national identity in ways that make the country
(and thereby her citizens) unique and powerful.
Plan of the Thesis
In my first paper, I develop a typology of national identities, and then use each type in
a multivariate regression in order to compare their impact on attitudes on immigration.
5Reuters, “Dutch Anti-Islam Leader is Major Winner in Polls,” 3/3/10.
6The liberal VVD was the top party with 20.4%, which translated to a gain of 9 seats for a total
of 31, followed closely by the PvdA (Labor) who won 19.6% of the vote but lost 3 seats, leaving the
PvdA with 30 seats.
7The PVV and the DF are similar in other interesting ways: both parties surged onto the political
scene to become the third largest parties in their governmentbecoming a kingmaker party who could
determine a successful coalitional government. Both parties benefited from unexpected events: the
DF gained in popularity following the intense conflict over cartoons depicting Mohammed that were
published in Danish newspapers, and the PVV were the inheritors of Pim Fortuyns political legacy.
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In addition, I investigate the extent to which types of identity differ across countries.
This analysis uses the large-N, cross-national survey data from the 2003 International
Social Survey Program (ISSP), the most recent year in which the ISSP administered
a survey directly about identity. Thirteen Western European countries in the ISSP
survey were used in the analysis. The results show the differential impact of identity
types, first by comparing the correlations of each type with left-right positionality, and
then comparing the impact of each type of identity in a country-by-country multivariate
regression analysis of anti-immigrant sentiment.
In my second paper, I take up the Netherlands as a case study in the development
of anti-immigrant attitudes. The data for this paper was drawn from two surveys,
administered ten years apart: a survey done in 1998 with the aid of the University
of Utrecht, and my own survey in 2007. The dramatic events that took place during
this decade, including the assassination of two Dutch public figures, were connected
to the immigrant community in the Netherlands either tangentially or directly. These
unforeseeable events presented a natural experiment, making it possible to infer the
impact of these events on attitudes toward immigrants. I show that negative attitudes
toward Muslims increased significantly between the two surveys.
The third paper adds an explicitly political dimension to the analysis of anti-
immigrant sentiment. Using a multi-level model, I examine the relationship between
strength of party cue and anti-immigrant sentiment. The data came from two sources:
individual-level data was drawn from the 2003 ISSP survey; measurements at the party
level were drawn from Benoit and Lavers 2003 expert survey. There is significant vari-
ation at the party level on this issue. The results show that political parties on the
right have more coherent positions on immigration than parties on the left. I also find
that the relationship between party cues and anti-immigrant sentiment is strong and
significant, showing that political cues do impact individual attitudes on this issue.
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Chapter 2
Varieties of Nationalism: Types and
Effect of National Identity in
European Politics
Introduction
Recent work has shown that symbolic or abstract forms of identity can be as important
in shaping peoples attitudes as concrete, material concerns are. This calls for a more
systematic approach to identity, both as a concept and as a measure. I begin this paper
by comparing ways in which national identity is measured in several large-N, cross-
national surveys in Europe. I identify three forms of identification with the nation:
proximate (feelings of closeness to ones community at various levels); prideful (pride in
national accomplishments, past and present); and patricentric (an exclusionary sense
of nationality that emphasizes the superiority of the respondents nation over other
nations). Differentiating between these forms of identity will show that not all identities
are equally useful in understanding attitudes or behavior.
In the European context, fringe parties on the right have recently been able to
capitalize on the power of symbolic national identity. Examining the distribution of
different types of national identity across the left-right spectrum allows us to gain
some insight into whether these parties are preaching to the choir (that is, successfully
motivating their base) or are gaining votes by pulling from across the political spectrum.
The impact of identity is further explored by looking at differences between countries
in level and strength of the different identity types. Finally, the three different types
of identity are used in a regression analysis as predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment.
2.1 The (Re)Emergence of National Identities in
Europe
Western Europe was chosen as the context for this paper because of the resurgence
of national identities as a dimension of contestation, a development which has been
to varying degrees surprising and alarming to observers of European politics. In the
aftermath of the Second World War, nationalism was seen as one of the root causes
of conflict, a divisive and dangerous force. Then, too, the rapid social change of the
1960s and 1970s made national identity seem parochial and dated, the province of
older generations and right-wing partisans. As the European Community morphed
into the European Union, the possibility of transcending divisions between nations
implicitly included the idea of the emergence of a pan-European identity. As observers
of European politics well know, however, national identities have proved themselves to
be quite durable after all, and have had a significant influence on political competition
at both the national and European level.
During the tumultuous decades of the 1960s and 1970s, it became apparent that
the social and political bedrock was shifting, and new theories and descriptions of
political issues and action were required. The foremost theorist of this re-imagined
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political space was Inglehart (1971; 1977; 1990), whose influential work hypothesized
the emergence of a new system of values that would shape politics as older cleavage
structures dissolved (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Inglehart argued that the material
wealth of post-industrial societies would create populations whose concerns shifted
from concrete matters (food, shelter) to abstract concerns (the environment, gender
issues). The new social movements were expected to alter the dimensions of political
contestation, shifting away from Lipset and Rokkans historical cleavages and inhabiting
new areas of the political terrain.
An event concurrent with the rise of the welfare stateand occurring as Inglehart,
Lipset and Rokkan were theorizing political dimensionalityhas greatly influenced the
political world of Western Europe. That event was the in-migration of tens of thousands
of guest workers during the post-War labor shortage, as European economies (and
the welfare states which depended upon them) expanded at a rapid pace. Immigrant
labor was brought into Europe as a temporary solution, under the assumption that
immigrants would eventually return to their country of origin. Even as it became clear
that there were substantial and permanent minority populations in European countries,
the understanding of what it meant to be really French or truly German did not expand
to include these newcomers, and laws regarding naturalized citizenship often reflected
this distinction.
Two points have become apparent in the time since Ingleharts work was published.
The first is that many post-materialist social movements were actually about expression
of individual identity (with the goal of self-actualization); the rise of identity politics.
The second is that the post-materialist values that Inglehart identified were not uni-
formly embraced across the political spectrum. Post-materialist values were in some
ways simply the expression of existing values through new issues. For example, the
environmentalist movement built upon the lefts cosmopolitanism, universalism, and
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anti-capitalism to make the case for responsibility that transcended bordersand legis-
lation that placed limits on the rights of private property owners. As Inglehart (1979)
observed, many values of post-materialism were still associated with the leftthat is,
they had not transcended the left-right distinction but added detail to the left-hand
side of the map. Taken together, these points lead to the conclusion that canny political
actors on the right could take over the language of identity politics while promoting
exclusionary identities.
What might be a working definition of this particular identity component, that of
identifying with a nation? In very simple terms, to ascribe to a national identity is
to have the feeling of belonging to a territorially bounded community with a shared
history. It is also to internalize the characteristics of that community as part of ones
own individual identity. Identity considerations clearly point out the limitations of
understanding political behavior as analogous to economic behavior. Identity is not a
material thing which one may feel compelled to get, keep, and defend; when closely
examined, any identity turns out to be imaginary. One would expect that such an
intangible good could not compel people to action nor strongly color their attitudes.
Yet it does: Hooghe and Marks (2004), for example, find that identity plays a sig-
nificant role in respondents perspective on European integration, and Sniderman and
Hagendoorn (2007; also Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004) find national identity
to be more predictive of anti-immigrant attitudes than cost-benefit types of economic
considerations.
There are, however, more than adequate reasons why identity has not been used as
a variable in rigorous research (see Brubaker and Cooper 2000 for a critical perspective
on the uses of identity in the social sciences). It presents problems in terms of concept
(it is not clearly defined nor is it used in the same way across disciplinesor even within
disciplines) and measurement. As I discuss in my chapter on anti-immigrant sentiment
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in the Netherlands, the difficulty in systematically exploring identity, whether as a
motivation for behavior or a predictor of attitudes, is that it is seamless and situational.
Individuals usually move between different identities without requiring conscious cues
to guide them. While identities are expressed in movement, the tools social science
currently has to study identity are largely static. Survey questions are analogous to
a snapshot, capturing (more or less clearly, with greater or lesser levels of detail and
precision) a particular moment in time. A snapshot contains a great deal of information,
but it cant convey how people moved into the frame, nor how they will move out of it.
Abdelal et al. persuasively argue that identity-based research has become a sprawl-
ing subset of scholarship, which has in turn undermined the conceptual clarity of iden-
tity as a variable (2006: 695). The authors point out that one of the primary conceptual
issues that has not been satisfactorily addressed in identity research is how to concep-
tualize and investigate different types of identity (2006: 696), a gap this paper directly
addresses.
More precise definitions of identity types, and their relative strength and/or preva-
lence, should add some explanatory color to the snapshot. It should be emphasized
that the concepts of identity developed here are necessarily limited by the questions
typically asked about identity in surveys. Fine nuances of identity are unlikely to be
captured by a survey, and it is difficult to say whether an entire survey on questions
of nationalism does not in itself create a primed respondent who is more likely to rate
issues of national identity as important. The aggregate-level data of surveys could lead
to ecological fallacies, while individual-level narratives and anecdotes are difficult to
generalize. Nonetheless, thoughtful approaches to the information already gathered,
and the methods used to do so, can yield insights that may guide further research. In
the following section I delineate the identity types to be used in this analysis: their
sources, limitations, and related hypotheses. Specifically, I will demonstrate the utility
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of distinguishing between different types of identity: first, by showing variation across
the left-right scale and between countries; second, by testing the strength of association
of each identity type with negative attitudes toward immigrant populations.
2.2 Three Types of National Identity
Is a strong feeling of national identity always dangerous or deleterious? Some political
scientists have posited the necessity of national identity in order to create sustain-
able and stable political institutions and societies (Noelle-Neumann and Kocher 1987).
Many of the post-colonial conflicts within and between African nations, for example,
can be traced to the absence of national feeling and the prioritization of tribal identity
over national identity. Social psychologists, on the other hand, have often emphasized
the relationship between a positive evaluation of ones own group and the simultane-
ous devaluation or derogation of other groups (Tajfel 1970; Kosterman and Feshbach
1989; Brewer 1996), while others have sought to distinguish between constructive and
destructive forms of national identity (Staub 1989). A central question of social iden-
tity theory is the ways in which groups are evaluated, compared and ranked. Different
types of identity (as well as differing identity strengths or salience) would therefore be
accompanied by specific modes of judgment, relative vs. absolute, for example, evalu-
ating ones own nation vis--vis other nations as opposed to evaluating it according to a
universal or abstract standard.
Recognizing the substantive importance of identity, a variety of questions intended
to measure respondents identification with various groups and beliefs have been incor-
porated into a number of cross-national surveys. Surveys often mimic each other, as
the designers of surveys will use previously administered surveys as templates. Ideally,
this would lead to cross-survey comparisons of item responses; usually, it is simply a
matter of continuing to use established measures that are presumed to be consistent
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and informative.
Across the surveys I examined, the most commonly asked questions measure feelings
of closeness to community, what is here called proximate identity. Respondents are
asked to indicate how close they feel, on a scale that ranges from not close at all to
extremely close, to different social units to which they belong (town , region, nation,
continent). One might expect that feelings of closeness would be related to scale and
would uniformly decline as the scale grew larger. Most people would feel close or very
close to their town, slightly fewer would feel close to their region, fewer again for nation,
and the least for continent (or largest group). This is almost accurate, but in this survey
respondents felt equally close to their nation as to their town, while far fewer felt close
to their region and only about half felt any kind of closeness at all with the largest group
about which they were questioned. Questions about proximity, being both vague and
benign, are likely to play a minimal role in an analysis. A public which is jaded about
surveys and statistical studies (as most people in well developed countries tend to be,
bombarded as they are with information gathered from such studies) will tend toward
neutral attitudes (Knuston 1998). It requires provocative questions to overcome this
kind of opinion inertia.
The second type of identity commonly measured in surveys is prideful identity.
These questions ask the respondent to indicate their level of pride in the achievements
of their country in various areas (for example, sports, the arts, level of democracy). As
with questions about proximate identity, these questions are usually unobjectionable
and therefore unlikely to invoke an emotional response on the part of the respondent.
Indicating pride in national achievements does not in itself denigrate the achievements
of other countries (see Brewer 2001), and the questions do not ask the respondent to
place the achievements of their country in relation to other countries.
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Patricentric identity is often referred to as “exclusionary” or simply “nationalist”1
identity, and this is the type of national identity that is most commonly found to be
predictive of or correlative with certain attitudes. In the European context, it is often
investigated as part of an analysis of far-right parties and their supporters. Patricentric
identity indicates a deep attachment to particular conceptions or narratives about the
character of the nation and its people, and, in addition, the belief in the superiority of
the national character and way of life compared to other nations. Patricentric identity
appears to be primarily defensive. People who score highly on this identity type are
likely to be those people who respond to rhetorical strategies about the people (immi-
grants) or forces (globalization, Europeanization) that pose a threat to the imagined
community (Anderson 1991) of the nation.
2.3 Identity and Political Dimensionality
The left-right continuum has been periodically reviewed (Abramson and Inglehart 1986;
Inglehart 1971; Sharpf 1996), dismissed (Kitschelt 1994, Tarchi 1998), and reclaimed
(Bobbio 1996; Knutsen 1998). As its critics have pointed out, it is a relic of his-
tory, based on seating in the French Parliament after the revolution; but beyond the
anachronistic nature of the concept, critics of the scale further charge that it also tends
to be employed without consideration of context and therefore lacks cross-national com-
parability. In an effort to address this issue, Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) were
the first to study left-right self-placement in a comparative setting. Castles and Mair
(1984) used expert survey data to develop a standardized left-right scale, which is still
commonly employed.
1In the social psychology literature, Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) refer to negative (based on
comparative evaluation) national identity as “nationalism” and positive national identity (based on
absolute standards) as “patriotism.”
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Dalton (1998) found that the left-right scale was not very important to most re-
spondents but that they did still categorize themselves in this manner. Knutson (1995;
1997;1998) found that left-right remains associated with secular-religious values, and
is correlated with both economic and postmaterialist values. He also finds that people
continue to be willing to place themselves on the left-right scale, but that more people
are placing themselves in the center of the scale than previously. Knutson is agnostic
about whether this means more people are actually moving to the center or if they are
simply gaming the surveys in some way, either attempting to avoid a negative social
response from the interviewer or simply seeking to finish the survey more quickly. In
many surveys which are based on a variation of a Likert scale, the median response
is Neither agree nor disagree, which might reflect a truly centrist or neutral of view,
but might also be a default response on an issue which is not particularly important or
interesting to the respondent (and thus one which they are not going to spend a great
deal of time considering), or an unwillingness to proffer an honest opinion.
In their foundational work on the left-right scale, Castles and Mair (1984/1997)
pointed to the fact that it was generally accepted that left-right differences between
parties have major relevance for public policy outcomes (1997: 151) and that the degree
of ideological polarization on this scale influenced the way party systems functioned (or
failed to function). Some scholars have found that left-right placement correlates with
attitudes on particular issues. Lahav (1997), surveying British Members of Parliament,
found a relationship between left-right self-placement and attitudes on immigration and
European integration. Hooghe et al., using data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey
(CHES), found that it is possible to distinguish among certain kinds of policy positions
that are constrained by Left/Right positioning (2002: 972), and in the case of attitudes
towards continued European integration, parties of the far left and parties of the far
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right are equally Euroskeptical2 (Marks and Wilson 1999; de Vries and Edwards 2009).3
With the aim of establishing the utility of distinguishing types of identity when
possible, I test them against a construct of political spacethe left-right axisas well as
against an issue around which there is a great deal of contestation currentlyattitudes
toward immigrants. I expect to find variation between countries in the correspondence
of left-right self-placement and different types of identity. I also expect that, as earlier
work has shown, patricentric or exclusionary identity will be strongly associated with
anti-immigrant sentiment, and that the strength of this association will vary between
countries.
2.4 Data: Sources and Measures
In developing this typology, I examined the way identity was measured in several well-
regarded and frequently used surveys of the European population.
In addition to the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), which is adminis-
tered world-wide, there are two other cross-national surveys administered specifically
in Europe: the European Values Survey (EVS) and the Eurobarometer. The standard
Eurobarometer does have questions about identity, and they tend to be questions which
would measure patricentric identity.4 Secondly, the Eurobarometer is often concerned
2Though for distinct reasons: the extreme left fears that continued integration will erode the
welfare state, diminish workers rights and decrease environmental regulationin short, that European
integration is largely a project centered around free-market reforms. Right wing parties stake their
opposition on defending national sovereignty and identity.
3While these studies do offer support for the relevance of the left-right scale, it is also possible that
left-right placement is more accurate and more meaningful for people who are politically engaged and
informed (McLaren 2001). Expert surveys such as these, then, would tend to show a closer relationship
between political self-identification and sets of particular attitudes than surveys of the general public.
For example, the correlation between left-right positionality and support for European integration is
quite low in this data: r=0.04.
4Some Eurobarometers have also had questions measuring attachment, which could be used to
gauge proximate identity. Hooghe and Marks (2001), in fact, utilize these questions as a measure of
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with Europe-wide issues rather than issues internal to each country, and the national
level is still the primary stage on which contestation over immigration and national
identity plays out. The EVS is an intriguing dataset, because it has the potential to
link values and identity types, and thus give more insight into values that are constitu-
tive of each identity type. Unfortunately, the EVS has few questions about identity, and
those are only about the identity that we posit to be the weakest: proximate identity.
Those questions that are asked in all three surveys are similar in wording, suggesting
that they draw from the standard bank of questions asked by previous surveys (and
that there has been relatively little innovation in the measurement of this concept).
The ISSP is the only survey that offers enough data to support the development of
a typology of national identity, and the questions asked in the ISSP group naturally
into categories. For this reason, the ISSP is the best data set for the exploration of
identity types, since it contains questions about more than one dimension and it can
be shown whether responses to such questions reliably hang together. I use the data
from the year in which the identity module was administered (2003).
2.5 Method and Analysis
Because each of the identity types was based on sets of questions, factor analysis was
used to capture a latent dimension of the data within each set of items. Confirma-
tory factor analysis supported the claim that the sets of questions shared a sufficient
amount of variance to justify the creation of new variables which are based on the
latent commonality in the item sets. An alpha value above .70 among the items is gen-
erally considered sufficient shared variance. Proximate identity did not quite meet this
territorial identities in the EU. In the Eurobarometer taken closest in time to the ISSP survey, those
questions were not asked.
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threshold, but was close enough (0.65) to justify including it in the analysis.5 When
the items were factored, only those factors with an eigenvalue greater than one were
included in the created variables.6
The factor scores for patricentric identity highlight the core values of this group.
The highest factor loadings are the items about the importance of place of birth and
ancestry. The lowest are the items on the importance of language and respecting the
laws of the land. This is curious, first because in public debates there is often a great
deal of importance placed on language as an indicator of membership in the national
community. The low score of the importance of following the law is even more puzzling.
From Adorno’s (1950) work on the authoritarian personality to current studies (van
der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2005) that suggest a connection between a law-and-order
mentality and anti-immigrant attitudes, emphasis on respect for the laws of the land
has been seen as particularly characteristic of right-wing partisans. Here, however,
we see that the emphasis is on traits that cannot be acquired: ones ancestry and ones
place of birth, something that does not bode well for acceptance of assimilation-oriented
policies.
Correlations allow for ambiguity about causality, which is appropriate for the rela-
tionship between left-right position and types of identity. At the aggregate level, the
correlations between left-right self-placement and the four types of national identity
are moderate. As expected, the correlation varies between the three types. The lowest
correlation is between proximate identity and left-right (.09); the correlation jumps for
prideful identity (.17) and patricentric identity is the high-water mark (.23). (Opinions
about what constitutes significant correlation vary. While Cohens (1998) rule of thumb
5The Cronbach’s alphas for each were: proximate identity, 0.65; prideful identity, 0.79; patricentric
identity, 0.80.
6Because factor loadings are sometimes informative in themselves, I have included all items in the
appendix.
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is often used in the behavioral sciences (i.e. r < 0.23 is low, 0.24< r <0.36 is medium,
and r > 0.37 is high), one may also directly calculate a t-value (and thus a p-value)
using the formula: t = r/
√
(1− r2)/N − 2. Using this formula, the correlations of
0.16, 0.17 and 0.23 are in fact significant at the p < 0.0001 level. This indicates that
such a correlation is highly unlikely to be due to chance. Feelings of closeness to ones
community do not seem to be localized on the left-right continuum. As levels of prideful
and patricentric identity rise, however, the correlation coefficient grows larger, showing
that there is a linear relationship between these identity types and movement from the
left to the right of the political spectrum.
When the data is disaggregated, interesting differences between countries appear,
supporting the hypothesis of between-country variation in identity types (see Table 5).
In some countries all of the identity types correlate with right-wing position, while in
others there is no correlation with any identity type. Then there are several countries
in which only patricentric identity correlates with left-right. As expected, proximate
identity has very little purchase in this analysis, with the lowest correlations overall of
any of the identity types, while patricentric identity correlates strongly with left/right
positionality in seven out of twelve countries. In Switzerland and Austria, all three
identity types significantly correlate with left-right positionality. Conversely, there is
virtually no correlation between left-right position and any identity type in Sweden
and Finland. In fact, in the Swedish case the highest (though still weak) correlation,
patricentric identity, has a negative sign (-0.11), so seemingly the more right-wing the
respondent is on the left-right continuum in Sweden, the lower their level of patricentric
identity.
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Table 2.1: Pearson’s r Correlations Between Left-Right Placement and Identity Type
Country Proximate Prideful Patricentric
Germany  0.07 0.05      0.23***
France  0.07 0.14      0.41***
Netherlands  0.03 0.09      0.26***
Switzerland       0.28***       0.40***      0.35***
Austria       0.22***      0.18***      0.23***
Spain 0.06      0.35***       0.22***
Great Britain 0.02 0.09 0.10
Ireland 0.04 0.10 0.12
Finland 0.01 0.07 0.03
Sweden 0.02           -0.11 0.06
Denmark 0.11       0.24***        0.24***
Norway 0.07 -0.05  0.16
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Data from the ISSP 2003 survey, accessed through the GESIS/ZACAT archive.
Country names in bolded text indicate the presence of a far-right party in that country.
Proximate 0.14***
(0.01)
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In some countries, national identity as a dimension of political contestation still
maps onto the traditional left-right cleavages. Does the absence of correlation in other
countries indicate the opening of new political dimensions? The behavior of political
actors in those countries will reveal the answer to this question.
2.6 Identity Types and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment
In my paper on anti-immigrant sentiment in the Netherlands, I found support for
Sniderman and Hagendoorn’s (2007) argument that strong feelings of national identity
superceded economic concerns in influencing attitudes toward immigrants. The identity
typology allows for a more specific understanding of the relationship between identity
and attitudes toward immigrants. The type of identity that is salient in a particular
country and the manner in which it connects with the left/right dimension constrains
whether and how political entrepreneurs, say political parties, exploit
“Immigration creates a considerable potential for the mobilization of the
new cleavage in all six countries [that the authors examined]. In every one
of them, the share of the foreign population is sufficiently large, and, even
where it is relatively small, part of it is culturally sufficiently distinct to
become highly visible and potentially threateningthe fact that a large share
of immigrants comes from a culturally quite different background constitutes
a latent potential that is easily exploitable by political entrepreneurs bent
on mobilizing those on the losers side of the new cleavage” (Kriesi et al.
2008: 34).
Political actors will exploit this space by emphasizing the themes that resonate with
particularly strong (i.e. motivational) types of national identification. I expect that
patricentric identity will be the most powerful variable associated with anti-immigrant
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sentiment, with proximate identity the weakest. I further expect that this effect will
differ significantly between countries.
I created a measure of anti-immigrant sentiment through factor analysis of seven
items from the ISSP that indicated negative attitudes toward immigrants (Cronbachs
alpha: 0.79, minimum eigenvalue of 1) I then ran both bivariate and multivariate regres-
sion analysis for each identity type, with anti-immigrant sentiment as the dependent
variable. The purpose of the bivariate regression was to isolate the influence of identity
type specifically: how much variance was explained through identity alone? The mul-
tivariate regression included various control measures: left-right positionality, urban or
rural location, education level, occupation,7 age and sex. In the general model, each
type of identity was statistically significant, but varied in strength. Where proximate
and prideful identity explained only 1-2% of the variance on anti-immigrant sentiment,
respectively, patricentric identity by itself explained 24% of the variance. I expect
a similar pattern on the individual country level, but with variation between coun-
tries. Specifically, I would expect that in countries with anti-immigrant/xenophobic
parties (France, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands) patricentric identity
will explain a larger amount of variance on anti-immigrant sentiment than it does in
other countries. This proved to be the case. Patricentric identity was strongly asso-
ciated with anti-immigrant sentiment in every country in the data, with positive and
significant coefficients. Interestingly, the countries in which patricentric identity is a
significant explanation of variance on anti-immigrant sentiment are also countries in
which patricentric identity correlates with left-right positionality. In a next paper I
will show that these are also the countries where political party cues have the strongest
impact on immigrant attitudes. The results for prideful and proximate identity were
mixed. Though both explained very little variance on anti-immigrant sentiment in
7Defined as three categories: white-collar/management; skilled trades; unskilled work.
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Table 2.2: Bivariate Regression of Identity Types on Anti-Immigrant Sentiment (AIS)
Proximate
R2
0.14***
(0.01)
0.02
Prideful
R2
0.08***
(0.01)
 0.01
Patricentric
R2
N
0.47***
(0.01)
0.24
6130
***p<.0001
Beta coefficient followed by cluster-corrected standard errors (in
parentheses) and constant term.
Source: ISSP 2003 data, accessed through the ZACAT/GESIS archive.
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Table 2.3: Multivariate Regression of Identity Types on AIS
Proximate Identity
Occupation
Left-Right Position
Urban-Rural
Age
Sex
Constant
R2
N
 0.083*** (0.012)
 0.079***  (0.010)
 0.098*** (0.004)
 0.053*** (0.001)
 0.005*** (0.001)
-0.103*** (0.019)
-0.988*** (0.055)
 0.11
7473
Prideful Identity
Occupation
Left-Right Position
Urban-Rural
Age
Sex
Constant
R2
N
 0.018       (0.012)
 0.075*** (0.012)
 0.092*** (0.005)
 0.047*** (0.008)
 0.005*** (0.001)
-0.101*** (0.019)
-0.974*** (0.061)
 0.09
5795
Patricentric Identity
Occupation
Left-Right Position
Urban-Rural
Age
Sex
Constant
R2
N
 0.411*** (0.010)
 0.050*** (0.010)
 0.065*** (0.004)
 0.035*** (0.007)
 0.001*** (0.001)
-0.940*** (0.017)
-0.506*** (0.051)
 0.27
7145
***p<0.001
Source: ISSP 2003 data, accessed through the ZACAT/GESIS archive.
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any country, proximate identity was significant and positive in most countries, whereas
prideful identity was significant in only a few countries. Adding the control variables
to the model also gave mixed results. In general, the only other variable which was
significant in most of the cases was left-right positionality.
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2.7 Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper I demonstrated the utility of differentiating between types of identity.
Of the three types of national identity, only patricentric identity mapped onto the
traditional left-right dimensionthough not in all countries. As expected, patricentric
identity was the identity type most likely to be linked to anti-immigrant sentiment. The
fact that the effect of each identity type varies between countries has implications for
the political strategies adopted by parties in their domestic sphere. It also suggests one
reason why national identity is actively debated in some countries and not in others. In
this data, gathered in 2002 and 2003, we can already see the countries in which identity
is most likely to become, or continue to be, a contested political space.
The three types of identity discussed in this paper were perforce limited by the
instrument used to measure them. The possibility of developing more nuanced schemas
remains wide open. Rather than turning immediately to cross-sectional data, scholars
of identity would be well-served to carefully consider how best to approach the identity
they wish to understand (I hope the rubric of form, function, situation and salience
may be a useful starting point for inquiry). As Searing and Conover (2001) and Fearon
(1999) suggest, paying attention to the everyday use of terms is a way into a particular
web of context and meaning.
I suggest that there is another way of understanding identity which is difficult to
discern through survey data. This identity might be calledif following the alliterative
pattern established hereperformative8: an identity which rests upon a conception of
shared values and the appropriate behavior that follows from these values. In this un-
derstanding, assimilation would be revealed through their actions, i.e. as they perform
the role of a citizen of the nation: their willingness to follow the law of the land, their
8The concept of performative identity is adapted from the work of Judith Butler.
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speech (particularly which language they speak, and how they speak it), and their man-
ner of dress. Performative identity is active, both in the sense of the active perception
and judgment of the viewer and the actions performed by the other person. At the
same time, one cannot elide the fact that visibly different others are going to be rapidly
and unconsciously sorted by the mind long before such information reaches the linear,
rational, and verbal parts of the brain (Payne et al. 2009). Future surveys might allow
some insight into this identity type through questions focusing on understood norms of
behavior.9
2.8 Appendix
Table 2.7: Factor Loadings: Proximate Identity
Table 1: Factor Loadings for Proximate Identity Items
This set of questions is introduced the following way: “How close do you feel to your…”
Item Factor Loading
Town/City .61
County/Province .71
Country/Nation .52
Continent .35
Source: ISSP 2003, accessed through the GESIS/ZACAT archives.
Table 2: Factor Loadings for Prideful Identity Items
This set of questions is introduced the following way: “How proud are you of [Country] in
each of the following…”
Item Factor Loading
“Its political influence in the world” .62
“Its economic achievements” .59
“The way democracy works” .54
“Its armed forces” .54
“Its scientific and technological
achievements”
.53
“Its history” .52
“Its fair and equal treatment of all groups” .51
“Its achievements in the arts” .49
“Its social security system” .48
“Its achievements in sports” .46
Source: ISSP 2003, accessed through the GESIS/ZACAT archives.
9Or mixed method approaches: neuropsychologists have recently used fMRIs to investigate the
neurological activity of a perceiver who sees a member of a group distinctly other to themselves, and
found that different parts of the brain were activated depending on whether the person viewed was
regarded as in-group.
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Table 2.8: Factor Loadings: Prideful Identity
Table 1: Factor Loadings for Proximate Identity Items
This set of questions is introduced the following way: “How close do you feel to your…”
Item Factor Loading
Town/City .61
County/Province .71
Country/Nation .52
Continent .35
Source: ISSP 2003, accessed through the GESIS/ZACAT archives.
Table 2: Factor Loadings for Prideful Identity Items
This set of questions is introduced the following way: “How proud are you of [Country] in
each of the following…”
Item Factor Loading
“Its political influence in the world” .62
“Its economic achievements” .59
“The way democracy works” .54
“Its armed forces” .54
“Its scientific and technological
achievements”
.53
“Its history” .52
“Its fair and equal treatment of all groups” .51
“Its achievements in the arts” .49
“Its social security system” .48
“Its achievements in sports” .46
Source: ISSP 2003, accessed through the GESIS/ZACAT archives.
Table 2.9: Factor Loadings: Patricentric Identity
2
Table 3 : Factor Loadings for Patricentric Identity Items
The first seven items are introduced in the following way: “Some people say that the following
things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important.
How important do you think each of the following is...” The last three items ask the
respondent to indicate how much they agree or disagree with the statement given.
Item Factor Loading
“To have been born in [Country]” .72
“To have [Country Nationality] ancestry” .71
“To have lived in [Country] for most of one’s
life”
.65
“To be a citizen of [Country]” .61
“To feel [Country Nationality]” .52
“To speak [Country’s] language” .30
“To respect [Country’s] political institutions
and laws”
.19
“The world would be a better place if people
from other countries were more like [Country
Nationality]”
.54
“Generally speaking, [Country] is better than
other countries”
.51
“I would rather be a citizen of [Country] than
any other Country in the world”
.57
Source: ISSP 2003, accessed through the GESIS/ZACAT archives.
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Table 2.10: Factor Loadings: Anti-Immigrant Sentiment
3
Table 4: Factor Loadings for Anti-Immigrant Sentiment
This set of questions is introduced in the following way: “There are different opinions about
immigrants from other countries living in [COUNTRY]. (By "immigrants" we mean people
who come to settle in [COUNTRY]). How much do you agree or disagree with each of the
following statements?”
Item Factor Loading
“The government spends too much money
assisting immigrants”
.77
“Immigrants increase crime” .67
“Immigrants improve [Country’s] society by
bringing in new ideas and cultures”*
.67
“Immigrants are generally good for
[Country’s] economy”*
.61
“Immigrants take jobs away from people who
were born in [Country]”
.60
“It is impossible for people who do not share
[Country’s] customs and traditions to become
fully [Country Nationality]”
.57
“ [Country] should take stronger measures to
exclude illegal immigrants”
.55
Source: ISSP 2003, accessed through the GESIS/ZACAT archives.
*Reverse scored
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Chapter 3
The Dutch Dilemma: Evolving
Attitudes Toward Immigrants in
the Netherlands
Introduction
This paper examines attitudes towards immigrants and integration in the Netherlands
with an eye towards a purported shift in public attitudes against the backdrop of
a contentious decade that witnessed the rise of global tensions between the Islamic
world and the West, the emergence of anti-immigrant parties in the Netherlands, and
murders of two Dutch anti-immigrant politicians. Using survey data from two different
time points bracketing this tumultuous period in the Netherlands (the first taken in
1998 and the second in 2007) I look for evidence that the Dutch have developed a more
negative view of immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants, in that period of time. I
begin with a discussion of some of the prevailing theories of anti-immigrant sentiment,
move on to review the influential work done by Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2004)
based on a large-scale 1998 survey of immigrant attitudes in the Netherlands , then
detail my own survey in 2007 in which I replicate several questions ten years hence.
I discuss method, hypotheses, and the outcome of my analysis. I show that negative
attitudes toward Muslims have indeed increased considerably.
3.1 The Curious Case of the Netherlands
Dutch politics has often been seen as quite dull, even soporific. The deliberative style
fostered by consociationalism (Lijphart 1967) allows for plentiful debate, discussion,
and negotiationall of which takes time, so the pace of Dutch politics is usually some-
thing less than breakneck. This is, no doubt, much of the reason the helter-skelter
reshaping of the Dutch political scene since 2000 has drawn scholarly as well as pop-
ular attention.1The issue on which the boundaries of political debate shifted the most
was immigration policy. The Dutch shifted from an explicitly multiculturalist policy
to an actively assimilationist policy within a few short years. A policy implemented
in 2006, for instance, required all potential immigrants to the Netherlands to watch
a video about “the Dutch way of life,” emphasizing the acceptance of homosexuality
and equality of women in Dutch society.2 Searching for the causes of this volte-face,
most observers light upon two dramatic, unprecedented and extremely public events:
the rise of a charismatic and controversial politician, Pim Fortuyn, who voiced openly
anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim opinions that were previously considered beyond the
1For example, Ian Buruma, a frequent contributor to the New Yorker, wrote a popular-press book
about the murder of Theo van Gogh, as well as a number of articles in the New Yorker itself. Then,
too, there are any number of articles along the lines of ”From the Left, A Call to End the Current
Dutch Notion of Tolerance” (The New York Times, 11/29/2008) and ”The Dream of Multiculturalism
is Over” (The New York Times, 08/23/2005).
2This does not apply to all newcomers to Dutch society. Citizens of other EU member-states are
exempt from this requirement, as are skilled workers and asylum seekers. Potential immigrants from
the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Switzerland are also exempt.
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pale of Dutch politics. Fortuyn was assassinated in 20023 (by an animal rights activist)
prior to the general election; his eponymous party went on to win 26 out of 150 seats
in the Dutch Parliament, becoming the second-largest party. The electoral success of
the party was short-lived, but Fortuyn almost entirely redrew the dimensions of the
debates on immigrants and immigration policy in the Netherlands. The second obvious
shock to the system was the assassination of Theo van Gogh, the Dutch filmmaker, in
2004. Van Gogh’s killer was a Muslim extremist, and the note he stabbed to van Goghs
chest after the murder encapsulated the worst fears of the Dutch population about the
immigrant communities in their midst.
The purpose of this extended introduction is to highlight the circumstances that
make the Netherlands uniquely suitable for deepening our understanding of the waxing
and waning of anti-immigrant sentiment. In the Dutch case, we are presented with
a clear time frame within which social and political attitudes changed, and we have
an idea of how things looked before and after that time period. This is as close to
experimental conditions as social scientists can reasonably hope to get, an opportuntity
to test competing theories and infer causality with a bit more confidence than usual.
3.2 Two Theories of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment
Theories about the development of anti-immigrant sentiment on an individual level tend
to draw from two distinct fields. From the perspective of economics, anti-immigrant
sentiment is explained by competition over scarce resources. This view rests implicitly
on liberalism and the social contract theory which evolved from it. Rational, indepen-
dent individuals perceive that there are advantages to be gained by joining a group:
3I was actually in Amsterdam on the day of Fortuyn’s killing; I bought several Dutch newspapers
and spent the afternoon in a caf cobbling together the story. That was the day I began to follow Dutch
politics, out of pure curiosity and an inexplicable fascination with the Dutch people and culture (and
certainly without any intention of writing a dissertation about it).
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division of labor, increase in production of food and goods, and defense against a vari-
ety of threats. They consent to give up some of degree of personal freedom in exchange
for the benefits of being a member of the social group. Rather than competing mano a
mano for scarce resources, then, people belong to a group which competes with other
groups. Self-interest becomes embedded in group-interest, and, consequently, threats
to the group become threats to the self. Anti-immigrant sentiment can be explained as
a manifestation of this feeling of competition between groups, though the resources over
which groups are competing may have become more abstract (jobs, first and foremost,
but also welfare state benefits, public education, health care, and so on).
From the perspective of social psychology, feelings of group membership and prefer-
ence for ones own group do not require conditions of scarcity or explicit calculations of
benefit. Rather, through a series of experiments, it became apparent that individuals
were evidently predisposed to attach themselves to a group whenever given the least
opportunity to do so (Tajfel 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1981, 1986). The pre-eminent re-
searchers in this field, Tajfel and Turner, note that: “intergroup discrimination existed
in conditions of minimal in-group affiliation, anonymity of group membership, absence
of conflicts of interest, and absence of previous hostility between groups” (1981: 9).
This suggests that humans are innately predisposed to join groups, whether or not
there is a tangible benefit from doing so.
Political science has tended to support the economic view of anti-immigrant senti-
ment, finding that negative views on immigrants are more prevalent among people with
lower education and in low-skill occupations, the losers of modernity and globalization
(Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008). Presumably, immigrants will be entering the labor
force at the bottom of the economic ladder, directly competing with the native workers
for low-skill, low-wage jobs. Anti-immigrant sentiment is therefore understood as the
response of a particular subset of the native population to a direct economic threat
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(Borjas 1990; Hardin 1997). It follows that people with higher levels of education and
with more occupational skills have lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, because
they do not see immigrants as a threat to their economic survival (Kriesi et al. 2008;
Christin 2004; Citrin et al. 1997).
In any case, it cannot be proved whether the egg of rationally choosing to belong to
a group for survival preceded the chicken of always already being in a group. Rational
or not, group identification is a way to cognitively simplify a complex world, one of
many filters on the stream of consciousness. Once those filters are in place, an ongoing
process of evaluation is taking place. Individuals are estimating their status within
their own group, the status of their group compared to other groups, and seeking to
feel positively about themselves through positive evaluation of the groups to which they
belong (Brewer 1991; Brewer and Gardner 1996; Mummendy et al. 2001).
3.3 The Role of Threat and Fear
A feeling of “group-ness” is not inevitable, nor does it automatically assign a lower
place to all other groups (Brewer 1999). Identities are situational, contextual, and
relational, and part of human socialization is knowing what identity is appropriate
or acceptable to others and at which times. It is only under specific conditions that
the in-group is elevated at the cost of the out-group rather than an expression of
membership in one or the other. Usually, we shift between identities seamlessly, without
having to consciously choose which identity to enact at any given time. Threats (which
is to say, the instigation of fear), even seemingly mild, result in shifting cognitive
priorities. In experimental settings, fear is relatively easy to trigger and creates distinct
repercussions in mood, attitude and behavior (Greenberg et al. 1990). This feeling of
fear encompasses not only ones own physical being, but also ones symbolic identity.
Where fear might be taken to mean merely fear for ones physical survival, it is clear
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that the feelings of fear can be activated by a wide variety of threats, including symbolic
threatsthat is, threats to abstract notions (such as nationhood) that individuals have
come to consider constituent parts of the self. We could go further, and say that calling
identities parts of the self is still too material; its as if identities were accessories which
one could add, remove, or rearrange at will. If we understand an identity as a mode
of perception, a worldview which gives order and meaning and which may assuage our
anxiety about death (Becker 1971, 1975), then anything that contradicts that worldview
will provoke a defensive reaction (Kahan and Braman 2006).
A perceived threat to a meaningful identity tends to move that identity up into
the realm of conscious choice and awareness. The boundaries of self are expanded,
socially extended, so that a persons self-concept is centered around being a good or
representative member of the group (Brewer and Gardner 1996), and so that the well-
being of the group becomes integrally tied to the sense of well-being of the individual.
Because of this expanded self, this symbolic body politic, traumatic events such as 9/11
or the assassination of Theo van Gogh have an impact that is much greater than the
number of people directly involved, particularly when they are continually reiterated
by the media to which most people are constantly exposed.
3.4 The Netherlands: Bellweather of Change
Because the work of Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007; see also Sniderman, Hagen-
doorn and Prior 2004) provided the foundation for the survey and research I conducted,
I provide a brief synopsis of their research as an introductory framework for the data
analyzed here. Sniderman and Hagendoorn chose the Netherlands as their case study
for testing group conflict theory against social identity theory because of the historical
(if perhaps apocryphal) tolerance of the Dutch, their explicit embrace of multicultur-
alism, and the rapid shift in policy following the assassination of Theo van Gogh. In
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When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands,
Sniderman and Hagendoorn analyzed data from a large randomized and representa-
tive survey of the Dutch population (n=2007), administered in 1998 by the University
of Utrecht. Sniderman and Hagendoorn find strong support for the hypothesis that
threats to symbolic identity are stronger predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment than
economic threat. Their analysis, while not entirely discarding other explanatory theo-
ries, clearly finds empirical evidence that reinforces the claims made by social identity
theory. The authors shared their data with me, and it became the basis for my own
survey in the Netherlands.
Sniderman and Hagendoorn hypothesize that a certain subset of the population
may have a generalized readiness to perceive certain kinds of threats, such as threats
to economic well-being, which, in turn, may influence social attitudes. Another way of
putting this is: a certain proportion of any human population will be people who are
inclined to be fearful or anxious more often than is necessary or normal. Sniderman et
al. see this readiness to perceive threats as a predisposing factor (which may or may not
be mitigated on an individual level by education, the amount and type of media to which
they are exposed, their self esteem, or their economic status). These concerns may then
be triggered to affect social attitudes by situational factors (situational triggers), such
as a downturn in the economy. Sniderman et al. are interested in the interaction of
such “predisposing factors” with “situational triggers” and their combined influence
on attitudes towards ethnic minorities (2004: 36). To this end, they utilize several
different techniques.
Part of the survey consisted of a coupling/decoupling experiment, the aim of which
was to reveal predispositions to perceive threats to economic well-being and cultural
identity. Half of the respondents were given questions in which a threat (“I am afraid
of”) was paired with a cause of that threat (“because of ethnic minorities”). The
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remaining respondents were asked the same questions, but with the reference to the
cause, say ethnic minorities, omitted. They found that, as anticipated, When threat
judgments are coupled with a reference to ethnic minorities, people who perceive them-
selves to be threatened in one way are markedly more likely to perceive themselves
to be threatened in other ways (2004: 38). In addition to this test, the survey also
contained an experiment designed to manipulate the salience of the issue of economic
and cultural threats. In this experiment, respondents were asked about a hypothetical
group of immigrants who were either highly educated and skilled or without education
and skills, or who spoke Dutch fluently or didnt speak Dutch at all. In other words, the
respondents decide which of these is more important: economic integration, or cultural
integration. It mattered far more to respondents that new immigrants fit in culturally
than economically (2004: 42).
The authors also tried a priming experiment in which some subjects were given a
cue about their membership in the Dutch national identity, and the others were primed
as an individual. They find that the identity prime does have an effect. Among those
respondents who were least likely to feel their culture was threatened (the low cultural
threat condition) those who were primed for national identity were far more likely to
agree that immigration should be made more difficult.
3.4.1 Situational Triggers Defined
In addition to testing various theories and experimenting with priming mechanisms,
Sniderman and colleagues are searching for something elusive. They are attempting to
locate the mechanism, or the moment, in which latent beliefs become overt attitudes.
Under what conditions does anti-immigrant sentiment emerge? They are also trying to
see the attitudinal shift of different subsets of the population: those who are continually
mobilized against immigrants and those who may express anti-immigrant sentiment
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under certain conditions (or after certain events).
My survey, almost a decade after the original survey, adds another snapshot of public
opinion on these issues. The tenor of the public debate about immigrants, assimilation
(or lack thereof) in the Netherlands has shifted significantly over the past decade or
so, due in part to controversial politicians like Pim Fortuyn. The assassinations of
Fortuyn and, later, Theo van Gogh; the death threats against public figures like Ayaan
Hirsi Ali; the revelation of jihadist movements among Dutch-born Islamic youth: these
acted as a series of shocks to the Dutch population, especially to that segment of the
population which may have been passively anti-immigrant prior to these events. Events
of this kind may spur an immediate, fearful, defensive response among the population,
but it requires a narrative about these events, a continual and public remembering and
reconstructing, to sustain a significant shift in attitudes. The Dutch media have kept
the issues of immigration, integration and assimilationand their threat potentialin the
forefront of Dutch consciousness.
The time lapse between the University of Utrecht survey and my own, and the
significant political events and media focus in the intervening decade, can be seen as
a natural experiment. The attitudes expressed in the earlier survey can be conceived
of as a measure of a pre-existing condition, while the events of the intervening ten
years can be seen as situational triggers. The situational triggersthe events mentioned
above as well as the attacks on the World Trade Center, the London and Madrid
bombingsshould have increased the perception of cultural threat as well as increasing
the number of respondents who consider this an important issue. Media coverage, as I
discuss below, has played on the theme of cultural threat. The media in the Netherlands
has taken diffuse social anxiety and focused it on Islamic immigrants in particular.
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3.4.2 Mediated Opinion
The Dutch media actively reported on issues of immigration and assimilation through-
out the 1990s, keeping the topic elevated in public discourse, especially after the assassi-
nations of Fortuyn (although, as noted, Fortuyn was not killed by a Muslim extremist)
and van Gogh (Vliegenthardt and Boomgaarden 2007).
Roggeband and Vliegenhardt (2007) conduct a comprehensive examination of both
media and political coverage of issues of immigration and integration. They find that
not only coverage of the issue itself increases over time, but also that the way the
issue is framed shifts. The discourse on immigrants has shifted from what they term a
multiculturalist frame to the frames of “Islam as threat” and “assimilationist.” They
show a steady movement away from using the language of multiculturalism—in both
political and media discourse—towards using language of threat, including language
that suggests that immigrants are a “problematic group.” The frame used depends in
part on the political composition of Parliament over time as well as external events.
The survey used by Sniderman and Hagendoorn is a comprehensive exploration
of extant theories of anti-immigrant sentiment: items measuring feelings of fear and
threat; levels of hostility toward other groups; amount of interaction with immigrant
groups (social distance); feelings of Dutch-ness; self-esteem; and authoritarian values.
Standard demographic questions about age, sex, education and economic status are
also included. Since the 1998 survey was a general population sample while the 2007
survey was administered only to college students, two comparisons are requiredwithin
the 1998 survey itself and then between the 1998 survey and the 2007 survey. That is,
how do young, college educated respondents to the 1998 survey compare to the rest of
the sample from that same year? This provides a baseline for the second comparison:
between the young, college-educated subset from 1998 and its counterpart in 2007.
In their measures of global evaluations of Muslims, Sniderman and Hagendoorn
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found that approximately 55% of respondents disagreed with the statement “Muslims
have a lot to offer Dutch culture.” Their respondents split 50-50 on the question of
whether “Western European and Muslim ways of life are irreconcilable.” And they
also split almost evenly, with slightly more (53%) agreeing with the statement, “Most
Muslims in the Netherlands respect other cultures” (2007: 23). Negative judgments of
Muslims were, unsurprisingly, strongly correlated across items.
Table 3.1: Anti-Muslim Attitudes, 1998
Anti-Muslim Attitudes in the General Population, 1998
“Muslims have a lot to offer to Dutch culture.”
Strongly Agree 14.4
Agree 30.9
Disagree 19.4
Strongly Disagree 35.3
“The Muslim way of life and that of Western Europeans are incompatible.”
Strongly Agree 30.5
Agree 22.1
Disagree 20.6
Strongly Disagree 26.9
“Most Muslims in the Netherlands respect other cultures.”
Strongly Agree 21.1
Agree 30.1
Disagree 21.8
Strongly Disagree 27.0
N=2007, results given as percentages.
Source: Survey was conducted with the aid of the University of Utrecht. Data
gathered 1997-1998.  Data accessed through the Survey Documentation and
Analysis (SDA) site maintained by the University of California, Berkeley.
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3.5 Vrije Universiteit, Spring 2007
My own subject pool was drawn from students at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam.
For accurate comparison of the two data sets, only subjects from a similar age range
were kept in the earlier data. The under-30 cohort in 1998 were markedly more positive
about Muslims than the general population, and, overall, they did not perceive the
Dutch culture to be under threat. In the 1998 survey, the under-30 group showed
marked agreement with positive statements of Dutch identity (e.g. “I am proud to be
Dutch”). This strong sense of identity, however, was not correlated with high levels of
feelings of threat or anti-Muslim or anti-immigrant sentiment. Most of the respondents
disagreed with generalized, negative statements about Muslims and immigrants. Very
few respondents had a feeling of cultural threat, even those who identified as right
or center-right. The fact that the 2007 survey was composed of university students
thereby creates a conservative experiment. It stacks the deck in favor of a null result,
e.g. that attitudes toward immigrants have not become increasingly negative.
The survey I administered in the spring of 2007 was primarily focused on differences
in attitudes which could plausibly have been affected by the shocking events that oc-
curred in the meantime: views on immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants, levels
of national identity, and perceptions of economic and/or cultural threat.
My sample size was 86, young (average age = 21), and well educated. Most of the
respondents were single and without children, they all spoke Dutch fluently, and the
language they heard most at home was Dutch. Most of them went to schools that
were primarily native Dutch. The group was tilted slightly towards the left on the
left/right political ideology scalenot particularly surprising. Approximately 25% of the
respondents identified as left, 25% as center-left, 25% as center, 14% percent identified
as center right, and 3% as right. Having such a homogenous sample has the advantage
of ensuring that the control group and the primed group are virtually identical on most
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indicators. Having such a homogenous sample has the advantage of ensuring that the
control group and the primed group are virtually identical on most indicators.
In addition to replicating items from the 1998 survey, questions from the Interna-
tional Social Survey Program and the European Social Survey were included. Some
questions used a Likert scale, while other questions were more open-ended and sought to
have the respondents discuss their everyday lives and experiences (for example, “What
language do you most often hear in your neighborhood?”). Other questions sought
to measure authoritarian attitudes, which have been correlated with anti-immigrant
sentiment in the past (see Adorno et al. 1950).
I also administered an identity prime to half the sample, to see if subjects were
responsive to nationalistic cues and if that response would correlate with certain at-
titudes towards immigration and/or out-groups. In line with the findings of social
identity theory (Tajfel 1970) that people respond to slight invocations of group feeling,
I experimented with a minimalist prime. I was attempting to elevate the respondents
feelings of national identification. If subjects responded significantly to the minimal
prime, they would arguably be much more likely to respond to an emotive, substantive
prime, either an unusual event in the world or ongoing media framing and coverage of
the subject.
Participants in the primed group read a statement which began: “God created the
earth, but the Dutch created the Netherlands” and then went on to detail the engi-
neering achievements of the Dutch in their ongoing battle against time and tide. (One
might argue this prime could present some problems of interpretation. For one thing, in
a survey which asks direct questions about religion and religious sentiment, introducing
God into a nationalistic prime could have the effect of highlighting religion. However,
this is a well known proverb and it actually points away from God as a creator.) The
intention was to avoid an overt prime that would alert subjects to the intention of the
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experiment, one which could potentially cause the respondents to respond in a reaction
against the prime. Respondents in the control group read a news article about the
launch of the largest passenger plane yet built. Both groups were told that they would
be asked questions about these topics at the end of the experiment.
The priming condition did not have a measurable effect on either feelings of Dutch
identity or threat to the Dutch nation. T-tests on both individual and indexed variables
showed no statistically significant differences of means between the primed group and
the control group.
Interestingly, the 1998 and 2007 samples varied on questions of identityand not
necessarily in the expected direction. Because in my own survey the prime had no
impact on identity, I was able to use the whole sample for comparison with the adjusted
Sniderman and Hagendoorn sample. On these questions, the mean response (level of
disagreement) to prompts such as “I am proud to be Dutch” and “I consider myself a
typical Dutch person” increased. Put another way, levels of national identity actually
dropped in this sample group between the two time points, complicating the picture of
increasing feelings of national identity and increasingly negative views on out-groups
moving in tandem.
3.5.1 Reinterpreting Support for Assimilatory Policies
Scholars have assumed that high levels of national identity correlate with anti-immigrant
attitudes, and there is support for these claims. But it can also be argued that those
people who take most pride in their way of life and their cultural values will place a
high level of importance on immigrants agreeing with, and assimilating to, those val-
ues. This result was one of the strongest attitudinal results, with nearly 75% of the
respondents agreeing with the statement, and a similar percentage (70%) agreeing that
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Table 3.2: Dutch Identity: Two Samples Compared
2
Dutch Identity in Comparison (Percentages)
“I am often aware of being Dutch.”
1998 2007
Strongly Agree/Agree 54 65
Strongly Disagree/Disagree 46 35
n 85 70
“I see myself as a typical Dutch person.”
Strongly Agree/Agree 47 62
Strongly Disagree/ Disagree 53 38
n 87 63
“I am proud to be Dutch.”
Strongly Agree/Agree 72 79
Strongly Disagree/ Disagree 28 21
n 87 63
“If someone criticizes the Netherlands, it is as if they are criticizing
me.”
Strongly Agree/Agree 27 45
Strongly Disagree/Disagree 73 55
n 85 65
Note: 1998 survey data adjusted for age and education level.
Sources: 1998 Sniderman and Hagendoorn/University of Utrecht data,
accessed through the SDA archives. 2007 VU data from author’s survey
conducted at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, Spring 2007.
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immigrants must also learn Dutch. A majority (58%) of subjects disagreed with allow-
ing Muslim students to opt out of certain activities, such as physical education, even if
it conflicted with their beliefs.
This survey indicates that one may identify with a national group, tolerate (or at
least, express tolerant attitudes toward) the diverse practices of other groups, and yet
still desire immigrants to assimilate. Debates about immigrants often dichotomize these
positions: either one is completely accepting of any practices in immigrant communities
that can be attributed to culture, or one wants to forcibly assimilate all immigrants into
the dominant culture. Instead, it may be helpful to see this as a differential attitude
towards difference itself: some kinds of difference are more easily accepted than others.
After all, if one largely agrees with the values and culture of ones own society, it follows
that one would see no particular objection to asking others to assimilate to it. It also
hints at the acceptance of the idea of one kind of behavior at home and another in the
outside world: those differences which can be treated as private and centered on the
homefor example, the food one cooks and eats, the music to which one listenscan be
easily tolerated. Those things which impact the public sphere, on the other hand, such
as language and obedience to the law of the land, are issues upon which people are less
likely to be tolerant.
3.6 Increasing Intolerance: Attitudes Toward
Muslims
Young and well-educated respondents are typically the most tolerant of any group.
Having little to lose economically, they tend not to feel threatened financially or in
their job prospects by immigrants. A university education tends to expose people to a
diverse range of groups, leading to more tolerance. In the 2007 sample, for example, all
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respondents had friends from other racial, religious and political backgrounds. Hiscox
and Hainmueller (2007) found that elites across Europe are more cognizant of the
benefits of immigration, and also share a skill-set that is transportable, giving them
more mobility.
This is why a shift in attitude among this group is of particular interest. Simple
percentages tell part of the story: not a dramatic shift from one end of the attitudinal
spectrum to the other, but a shift across the center, with respondents moving toward a
more negative assessment of Muslims. A dataset was created using only the questions
from each survey that matched identically. The Sniderman and Hagendoorn survey was
again controlled for age and education. Responses from the 2007 survey were coded
into four response groups, from strongly disagree to strongly agree, to match the coding
of the Sniderman and Hagendoorn survey. The percentages were calculated first with
the no opinion responses included, and then again excluding these responses.
Some startling changes are immediately evident. Responses were drastically differ-
ent on the item measuring feelings of cultural threat. In the corollary subset of the 1998
data, only 14% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “I am
afraid the Dutch culture is increasingly threatened, while 67.4% strongly disagreed with
that assessment. In the 2007 survey, the number of respondents who strongly disagreed
with the statement dropped to 9.5% (or 12.7% when non-responses were dropped): a
shift of between 54 and 57%. The two subgroups in the 1998 data both landed on the
side of disagreement, as indicated by means of 3.5 and 2.8 (where 3 is disagree and 4 is
strongly disagree). The 2007 data is a mirror image of the 1998 data, with both groups
agreeing to feelings of cultural threat (means of 1.9 and 2.0, where 1 is strongly agree
and 2 is agree). Comparisons of feelings of Dutch identity showed that respondents in
2007 were more likely to agree with statements about feelings of Dutch-ness than the
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Table 3.3: Feelings of Cultural Threat
3
Cultural Threat (Percentages and Means) 
  
Item: “I am afraid the Dutch culture is increasingly threatened.”
Sniderman &
Hagendoorn 1998,
Age/Education
Adjusted*
Widened
education
group**
VU
2007
With “no
opinion”
dropped
Strongly Agree 4.7 18.8 6.0 7.9
   Agree 9.3 19.4 28.6 38.1
     No Opinion -- -- 28.6 --
          Disagree 18.6 22.9 31.0 41.3
       Strongly Disagree 67.4 38.8 9.5 12.7
n 86 166 86 63
Mean 3.5
(0.8)
2.8
(1.0)
1.9
(1.1)
2.0
(1.3)
*With only university graduates included  **Including those who are in university but
have not completed their degree. Standard deviations in parentheses following means;
pairwise deletion of observations missing data.
Sources: 1998 Sniderman and Hagendoorn/University of Utrecht data, accessed through
the SDA archives. 2007 VU data from author’s survey conducted at the Vrije Universiteit
in Amsterdam, Spring 2007.
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Table 3.4: Anti-Muslim Attitudes, Item 1
4
Anti-Muslim Attitudes, Item 1 (Percentages and Means)  
 
Item: “Muslims have a lot to offer to Dutch culture.”
Sniderman &
Hagendoorn 1998,
Age/Education
Adjusted*
Widened
education
group**
VU
2007
With “no
opinion”
dropped
Strongly Agree 32.6 22.5 14.3 21.1
Agree 45.4 42.6 29.8 43.9
No Opinion -- -- 28.6 --
Disagree 12.8 16.3 20.2 29.8
Strongly Disagree 9.3 18.6 3.6 5.3
n 86 166 86 63
Mean 2.0
(0.9)
2.5
(1.0)
2.3
(1.0)
2.5
(1.3)
*With only university graduates included **Including those who are in university but
have not completed their degree.  Standard deviations in parentheses following means;
pairwise deletion of observations missing data.
Sources: 1998 Sniderman and Hagendoorn/University of Utrecht data, accessed through
the SDA archives. 2007 VU data from author’s survey conducted at the Vrije Universiteit
in Amsterdam, Spring 2007.
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Table 3.5: Anti-Muslim Attitudes, Item 2
5
Anti-Muslim Attitudes, Item 2 (Percentages and Means)
 
Item: “The Muslim way of life and that of Western Europeans are incompatible.”
Sniderman &
Hagendoorn 1998,
Age/Education
Adjusted*
Widened
education
group**
VU
2007
With “no
opinion”
dropped
Strongly Agree 8.1 16.9 3.6 5.0
Agree 15.1 18.0 19.0 26.7
No Opinion -- -- 28.6 --
Disagree 37.2 28.3 33.0 46.7
Strongly Disagree 39.5 36.5 3.6 21.7
n 86 130 86 60
Mean 3.1
(1.0)
3.1
(1.0)
1.6
(1.0)
1.5
(1.2)
*With only university graduates included **Including those who are in university but
have not completed their degree. Standard deviations in parentheses following means;
pairwise deletion of observations missing data.
Sources: 1998 Sniderman and Hagendoorn/University of Utrecht data, accessed through
the SDA archives. 2007 VU data from author’s survey conducted at the Vrije Universiteit
in Amsterdam, Spring 2007.
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Table 3.6: Anti-Muslim Attitudes, Item 3
6
Anti-Muslim Attitudes, Item 3 (Percentages and Means)  
 
Item: “Most Muslims in the Netherlands respect other cultures.”
Sniderman &
Hagendoorn 1998,
Age/Education
Adjusted*
Widened
education
group**
VU
2007
With “no
opinion”
dropped
Strongly Agree 35.0 26.3 22.6 27.1
Agree 42.5 38.2 34.5 41.4
No Opinion -- -- 28.6 --
Disagree 20.0 17.7 33.3 30
Strongly Disagree 2.5 17.7 15.5 1.4
n 86 116 86 70
Mean 2.0
(0.9)
2.0
(1.0)
2.5
(1.1)
2.6
(1.2)
*With only university graduates included  **Including those who are in university but
have not completed their degree. Standard deviations in parentheses following mean;
pairwise deletion of observations missing data.
Sources: 1998 Sniderman and Hagendoorn/University of Utrecht data, accessed through
the SDA archives. 2007 VU data from author’s survey conducted at the Vrije Universiteit
in Amsterdam, Spring 2007.
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earlier cohort. A pattern similar to the response on feelings of cultural threat is observ-
able in responses to the item The Muslim way of life and that of Western Europeans
are incompatible. Though a higher percentage (8.1%) of the young, educated group in
1998 strongly agreed with this item (in the 2007 sample, the percentage was 3.6/5.0%),
the overall means show the two 1998 samples as disagreeing with the statement (3.1
each), while the 2007 subgroups both land on the side of agreement (1.6 and 1.5).
These differences are interesting, but are they truly significant? A dummy variable
was created to separate the data by survey year. Paired t-tests were then run on each
variable. On the item Most Muslims in the Netherlands respect other cultures we would
expect to see that the mean would go downthat is, that respondents in the 2007 survey
would be less likely to agree with this statement than respondents in the 1998 survey.
In fact, the mean did drop from 2.7 (SD =1.4) in the 1998 sample to 2.0 (SD=0.79) in
the 2007 sample, enough to eliminate the null hypothesis at the .05 level.
There was also a shift in response on the question of whether Muslims have a lot to
offer to Dutch culture. The mean response to this question in 1998 was 2.5 (SD=1.0);
in 2007, 2.3 (SD=1.0). Though this still shows most respondents agreeing with this
statementa positive assessment of the out-groupthe difference between the means is
again significant enough to eliminate the null hypothesis at the .05 level.
Political (Dis)Engagement
My study included questions about the level of political engagement of respondents.
These questions were asked with a mind toward seeing if there was a kind of catalyst
group for whom political issues, be they immigration or something else, had motivated
them to become more active in politics. The answer appears to be no. The sample
was not socially or politically active. Most do not belong to a study group, club or
neighborhood organization. Only six of them contacted a politician in the last year,
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and only one worked with a political party. Three-quarters did vote in the last election,
about in line with the Dutch average. For most of them, levels of interest in politics
remains the same over the last twelve months, or decreases. Only a quarter found that
politics were becoming more interesting. Unfortunately, the group as a whole was so
politically inactive that no conclusions could be drawn about those who did participate
in political activity or their reasons for doing so. I found that left-right positionality did
not correlate with either levels of national identification or negative attitudes towards
immigrants.
3.7 Comparative Regression Analysis
Using some of the variables that were common to both surveys, I constructed two
multivariate regression analyses of anti-Muslim attitudes on individual and collective
threat variables, self-esteem items, and authoritarian values. This analysis mimics one
done by Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004: 41; also see the appendix to their
paper for question choice and wording), using the same items to measure collective
cultural and economic threat, individual safety and economic threat, self-esteem, and
authoritarian values. Their dependent variable is stereotype prejudice, a measure of
hostility toward particular ethnic/minority groups. My dependent variable is anti-
Muslim attitudes, derived from a factor analysis of five items in the survey which had
to do with perception of Muslims (Cronbachs alpha=0.71 for the 1998 subset; 0.65 for
the 2007 sample). The results cannot be exactly comparable because of this difference
(also, Sniderman et al. included occupation and unemployment variables, which were
less relevant to my sample of students). Nonetheless, as the authors of the previous
study found that hostility toward one other group correlated strongly with hostility
toward every other group, the dependent variables are tapping into the same dimension.
The regression analysis done by Sniderman et al. found collective cultural threat,
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Table 3.7: Multivariate Regression Analyses of Anti-Muslim Attitudes
7
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Note: 1998 survey data adjusted for age and education.
Sources: 1998 Sniderman and Hagendoorn/University of Utrecht data, accessed via the
SDA archives.  2007 data from author's survey conducted at the Vrije Universiteit in
Amsterdam, Spring 2007.
Multivariate Regression Analyses of Anti-Muslim Attitudes, 1998 & 2007
 1998 (Subset) 2007
Collective Cultural Threat      0.33**
 (0.12)
0.30***
(0.08)
Collective Economic Threat 0.21
 (0.13)
-0.02
(0.20)
Individual Safety Threat 0.11
 (0.09)
0.04
(0.09)
Individual Economic Threat 0.10
 (0.17)
0.07
(0.13)
Self Esteem 0.10
 (0.23)
-0.01
(0.06)
Authoritarian Values 0.10
(0.10)
 0.14*
(0.08)
Constant
-1.18*
(0.53)
-1.03
(0.59)
Adjusted R-squared 0.23 0.21
N 70 86
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individual economic threat, and authoritarian attitudes to be significant indicators of
stereotype prejudice (2004: 41-42). Collective cultural threat was also far and away
the most significant variable in my analysis as well, both in the 1998 subgroup (beta
coefficient: 0.33, and significant at the 0.01 level) and even more so for the 2007 sample
(beta coefficient: 0.30 and significant at the 0.001 level). Neither individual economic
threat nor self-esteem were significant in the model, while authoritarian values were
significant only for the 2007 group (beta coefficient: 0.14, significant at the 0.05 level).
In both the 1998 and 2007 samples, economic anxiety was generally very lowone of the
advantages of youth and the insulated environment of the university.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
The rapid change in public opinion and government policy on immigrant communities
in the Netherlands surprised many observers of Dutch politics. This shift was often
attributed to the extraordinary events that occurred in a span of less than ten years.
By taking a survey done in 1998 and replicating it nearly ten years later, I was able to
show that these events did have an impact on political attitudes.
Both the 1998 and 2007 surveys indicate that younger and more educated members
of society tend to be more tolerant than the society as a whole. However, even this
particularly tolerant group is susceptible to events and media framing of out-groups
in their society. We can see that, over time, even young and educated respondents in
the Netherlands have grown increasingly uneasy about immigrants, particularly Mus-
lims, in their societyand the perception of threat has increased. The situational trigger
worked through these most inauspicious circumstances. We can tentatively extrapolate
from this that a larger sample size would show an even more pronounced shift among
the general population. The results of the regression analyses emphatically show that
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perceiving ones own group to be under threat increases levels of hostility toward mem-
bers of other groups. Further, this anxiety about collective identity trumps economic
threat and authoritarian values.
Finally, it is notable that this young and educated group has shifted in favor of
assimilationist policies. In Sniderman and Hagendoorns survey, there was very little
support for statements such as Immigrants should behave like the Dutch and Immigra-
tion policy should be stricter (less than 25%). In my survey ten years later, more than
two-thirds of the respondents agreed with the idea that immigrants must learn some-
thing about the Dutch way of life before they arrive, and there was near-unanimous
agreement that immigrants should learn Dutch. Along with high levels of agreement
to liberal values, these attitudes suggest a renewed commitment to “common-sense”
Dutch values.
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Chapter 4
Divisive and Effective: The Impact
of Party Cues on Anti-Immigrant
Sentiment in Europe
In many European countries, anti-immigrant sentiment has become an issue that
defines political competition. Political entrepreneurs (individuals who are able to create
innovative or unexpected outcomes, often by adding a new dimension to the political
space (Riker 1986; Schneider and Teske 1992)) have been able to exploit and expand
upon feelings of fear and insecurity by presenting immigrants as the primary threat to
the cultural integrity of the national community. By successfully framing immigration
as an issue of shared values and beliefs (rather than racial or ethnic prejudice), political
entrepreneurs have gradually moved the debate into the mainstream. As they have
gained supporters by exploiting this issue, established parties have had to address it as
well. In light of the ongoing importance of issues surrounding immigration, examining
the connection between elite cues and public attitudes furthers our understanding of
party strategy and political realignments in this contested political terrain.
In the following, I will present the relevant literature on the role of elite cues and
theories of the development of negative attitudes toward immigrants, and the hypothe-
ses derived from this scholarship. I then detail the sources of data, operationalization
of variables, and the hierarchical model used in the analysis, summarize the empirical
findings based on this model, and conclude.
4.1 Mapping Anti-Immigrant Sentiment
Political divisions in European politics have traditionally been understood in terms of
the left-right dimension (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Parties of the left have been associ-
ated with state intervention in markets, multiculturalist and cosmopolitan perspectives,
and new politics issues such as environmental protection and animal rights. Parties of
the right have been in favor of minimal state intervention in markets, nationalism and
traditional/patriarchal values. While alternatives to the left-right schema have been
suggested (Kriesi et al. 2008; Hooghe et al. 2002), there is evidence that left-right
still structures political competition on many issues (Hooghe et.al. 2002, 2005; Hix et
al. 2005) and this is true of anti-immigrant sentiment, which is still primarily asso-
ciated with the right-wing. Parties of the right and far-right, in particular emergent
fringe parties (for example, the PVV in the Netherlands) have successfully capitalized
on public anxiety about immigrant populations. Far-right parties have a high level of
internal coherence about both the importance of issues of assimilation and immigration
and their positions on these issues. They are in a position, therefore, to communicate
a very clear and strong cue on anti-immigrant sentiment. Parties of the left and center
are more muted in their responses. While they may see it as a highly salient issue, they
are unable or unwilling to take the strong anti-immigration stance of the right-wing
parties. This internal incoherence diffuses their message to the public, leaving voters
to impute party position on immigration based on ideology or the policies supported
by the party in the past. Recent elections at both the European and national levels
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Table 4.1: Salience vs. Strength of Anti-Immigrant Cue
18
Table 1:  Salience of Immigration vs. Str ngth of Anti-Immigrant Cue
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 Source: Benoit and Laver Party Expert Data, 2003-2004.
have shown that a clear and coherent message, even if only on a single issue, can be
surprisingly effective. Using a two-level hierarchical model, I show that strength of
anti-immigrant cues given by party elites increases levels of anti-immigrant sentiment
on the individual level.
4.1.1 Multi-Level Models
Multi-level models mimic a world in which individuals are situated in (nested in) groups
of varying size, complexity, and influence. Proponents of multi-level analysis argue that
a classical regression analysis treats differences between and within these nested clusters
as nuisance rather than information (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005: 74). Multi-
level models, on the other hand, try to explain variation in the dependent variable
by including information from all levels of analysis in the model (Steenbergen and
Jones 2002). When investigating something like anti-immigrant sentiment, which is
predicated upon the existence of multiple groups in a society, the utility of a multi-level
model is clear. Anti-immigrant sentiment is an issue upon which we would expect to see
variation at different levels of analysisat the national level, influenced by conceptions
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of citizenship or number of immigrants; at the party level, where parties and political
actors seeking to distinguish themselves vary considerably in their position and cueing;
at the individual level, depending on socioeconomic factors.
4.2 Elite Cueing
Political elites have been shown to lead public opinion through their cues (Inglehart
1970; Zaller 1992); the way an issue is framed by elites or the media changes the way
individuals consider the issue when constructing their opinions (Druckman 2001: 1042;
on framing effects, see Riker 1986, Kinder and Herzog 1993, Sniderman 2000). Political
elites may signal the position of a party on an issue as well as how important the issue
is to the party and the public. Cues are one way that political actors have of claiming
political space. If a party effectively brings an issue into the mainstream, that party
has increased the salience of an issue and, simultaneously, clearly communicated its
position on the (suddenly relevant) topic.
A considerable body of work has accumulated on the connection between elite cue-
ing and public Euroskepticism (Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005;
Steenbergen, Edwards, de Vries 2007; de Vries and Edwards 2009) which have informed
the development of this model. Anti-immigrant sentiment and Euroskepticism are in
a sense sibling issues: both Euroskepticism and anti-immigrant sentiment have been
successfully utilized by entrepreneurial parties to command media attention, shift the
boundaries of political debate, and, most importantly, to win votes.1 Furthermore,
Euroskeptic and anti-immigrant parties play on the same themes: distrust of elites,
defense of national sovereignty and the national community, and economic uncertainty.
1Kriesi et al., for example, identify immigration and European integration as central to a new
cultural axis of competition (2008: 13) and also see cultural issues as more influential than economic
issues in structuring party positions (294).
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For example, De Vries and Edwards (2009) demonstrate that in the case of Euroskep-
ticism, the far-right and far-left parties which are most likely to promote Euroskeptic
attitudes do so by presenting different rationales for Euroskepticism. Parties of the left
appeal to economic/material concerns that European integration threatens the sustain-
ability of the national welfare states, while Euroskeptic parties on the right emphasize
the defense of the national community and national sovereignty against an encroach-
ing power. The prevailing explanations of anti-immigrant sentiment are also divided
between economic and cultural concerns.2 Extending the multilevel models employed
in analyses of Euroskepticism to the influence of parties on anti-immigrant attitudes is
a parsimonious progression.
This research adds to our understanding of cross-national variation in levels of anti-
immigrant sentiment. Partisan cueing on this issue is particularly influential because
explicitly hostile positions toward immigrant populations are still controversial. The
actors who say the most outrageous things about Muslims,3 or who introduce legislation
banning burquas,4 are likely to garner media attention.
When mainstream parties converge on an issue, space is created for a party to
challenge the status quo based on its status as outsider (Kriesi et al. 2008). Parties
which already have a relatively small vote share have incentives to take risks. They
can espouse controversial and original positions because they are usually not bound
to historical ideological positions or traditional constituencies who might be alienated
by a radical stance. They are also free to suggest policies that are impractical if not
impossible, since they are unlikely to be in a position to implement such a policy at
any time. In the meantime, they have amplified their cues and chosen frames through
2I would expect the correlation at the individual level between Euroskeptic attitudes and anti-
immigrant attitudes to be quite high.
3When Pim Fortuyn called Islam a backward culture, for example (de Volkskrant, 9 February 2002).
4As Geert Wilders did in 2005, though it did not pass; France enacted such a ban on 13 July 2010.
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the media without cost.
The cues given by right-wing parties in Europe are effective because they are simple
and coherent.5 They emphasize the common history and values of the nation (elevating
the ingroup) while contrasting these values to those of another group (derogating the
outgroup). These narratives take advantage of emotional and symbolic cues that are
processed rapidly and often subconsciously, triggering what psychologists call implicit
attitudes: associations that come to mind unintentionally, whose inuence on thought
and action may not be consciously recognized and can be difcult to control (Payne
et.al. 2009: in press).
The classical view of a voter is that of a rational individual who steps into the
voting booth with a clear ordering of preferences that will maximize the benefit to
that particular individual (Downs 1957; van der Brug et al. 2000). Ongoing research
has shown, however, that this kind of utilitarian calculation is relatively rare. Instead,
people use cognitive shortcuts whenever possible, relying upon gut feelings to quickly
eliminate most options and then choosing from the remaining (Damasio 2004; Tversky
and Kahneman 1981). Political parties offer one way of editing information. Assuming
that the voter feels reasonably well aligned with his party, following the lead of elites
simplifies things considerably. The effect of party cues is emphasized in individuals who
are cognitively mobilized–that is, paying attention to party positions (Inglehart 1970;
Zaller 1990, 1991, 1992).
Anti-immigrant cueing should be particularly effective, because the parties broad-
casting those cues are appealing to essential human needs and very basic systems of
cognition. The human drive for social belonging considerably predates their capacity
for abstract thought. Anti-immigrant parties will rely upon two primary cues: they
5See van Leeuwen’s (2007) discussion of Geert Wilders’ language use, for example.
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must define the boundaries of the group by identifying its value system (cultural world-
view), uniqueness, and status. They then will portray this unique community as under
siege, threatened by another group (with a different worldview and, therefore, with un-
intelligible motives and actions). Feelings of threat (Greenberg et.al. 1990) and group
identity (Tajfel 1970, 1979, 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986) arise with minimal stimuli
in social psychology experiments. A cue which combines threat with feelings of group
identity is likely to be quite powerful.6
The muted messages of the centrist parties will not usually be intended to arouse
high levels of emotion. Mainstream parties must present the status quo as more or less
acceptable, if for no other reason than that they are the actors to whom the status
quo will be attributed. The status quo may be satisfying or acceptable, but it is rarely
emotionally engaging. In proportional representation systems, governments are often
formed through coalitions between parties which must rely on compromise in order to
pass legislation and create policy. This makes it difficult for centrist parties to clearly
articulate the ways in which they differ from each other.7 We will return to this point
in our discussion of measuring party cues.
A word about the directionality of cueing (i.e. top-down, bottom-up, or reciprocal):
anti-immigrant parties would contend that they are responding to public fears and
concerns about immigrant populations in their country. In this case I am interested
only in the cues from elites to public (top-down cueing). I would argue that parties
broadcasting anti-immigrant cues are not directing them only at their partisans, but
6In addition to the compelling story of a common enemy which threatens a common identity, the
far-right also tends to emphasize a strongly anti-elitist message: a shadowy elitist ”they” has hidden
the truth and defied and manipulated the will of the people. By implication, this gives far-right parties
the quality of authenticity and the virtue of truth-telling.
7In consociational systems many of the policy decisions are made behind closed doors, encour-
aging moderation since compromise can be reached without any individual actor being portrayed as
retreating from a publicly held position (and therefore being perceived as weak or indecisive) (Lijphart
1967).
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are aiming at the broader electorate in the interests of altering the political agenda.
More to the point, variation among parties themselves is of primary interest.
4.3 Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: Concept and Causes
“Anti-immigrant sentiment” is a broad term. It leaves unspecified whether one has an
objection to every kind of immigrant or only against a particular group of immigrants
(and immigrant is likely to be interpreted according to the immigrant group uppermost
in the respondents mind). It does not necessarily differentiate between someone who
feels slightly uneasy at the sight of women in burquas and someone who is ready to
take up arms to defend the border. For the purposes of this paper, anti-immigrant
sentiment will be understood as a generally negative predisposition toward immigrants
which leads to support for restrictive immigration policies.
There are two predominant explanatory frameworks for anti-immigrant sentiment
on the individual level. The first is a materialist approach, which focuses on competi-
tion for scarce resources. From this perspective, negative attitudes toward immigrants
will be more likely if an individual feels she must compete against immigrants for jobs
or other resources. The groups most likely to feel a direct economic threat from im-
migrant groups are those with fewer skills and less education (Christin 2004; Citrin
et al. 1997; Hardin 1997). The second approach draws from studies of group identity
and membership that demonstrate that individuals are motivated to positively evalu-
ate a group to which they belong (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Brewer 1991, 1996, 1999;
Brewer and Pierce 2005). This positive “ingroup” evaluation is often (though not al-
ways) accompanied by a correspondingly negative evaluation of groups to which an
individual does not belong (Tajfel 1970; Brewer 1999). In light of this theory, negative
attitudes toward immigrant groups depend upon the nature and level of an individuals
identification with their own group. In the context of European politics, Hooghe and
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Marks (2004) find that national identity influences attitudes toward European integra-
tion; Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) show that concerns over group identity may
trump economic considerations in the formation of anti-immigrant sentiment (see also
Sniderman et al. 2004). By reinvigorating national identities, right-wing parties have
taken the ball from the left-wing identity politics of the 1960s and 1970s and run with
it. The identity-based movements of the right are a mirror image of the postmaterialist
identity groups of earlier generations.
While these theories tend to be presented in opposition to one another, they should
not be seen as mutually exclusive. Indeed, as Bobo points out, “the melding of group
identity, affect, and the interests in most real-world situations of racial stratification
make the now conventional dichotomous opposition of realistic group conflict versus
prejudice empirically nonsensical” (1999: 457). For example, left-wing opposition to
the welfare state has been framed as an economic resources or group-conflict concern
(Hooghe et.al. 2002; de Vries and Edwards 2009) but welfare state entitlement programs
often hinge upon ideas about who is deserving of support, and people tend to favor
programs that benefit people they perceive to be like themselves (i.e. with whom they
can identify).
Drawing on the theories and research presented above, I hypothesize the following:
first, that a strong anti-immigrant cue from parties will be associated with higher
levels of anti-immigrant sentiment; that the presence of a right-wing party will shift
the overall level of anti-immigrant sentiment; finally, that exclusionary national identity
will correspond with more negative attitudes toward immigrants.
4.4 Data and Method
The individual level data in this model were drawn from the 2003 iteration of the
International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The ISSP rotates modules on different
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issues; 2003 was the most recent year they administered the module on national identity.
For data on party position on immigration, I use information drawn from the 2003 party
expert survey performed by Benoit and Laver.8
I built a two-level model to measure variation in levels of anti-immigrant sentiment
at the individual level and at the party level. Hierarchical linear models, as previously
mentioned, allow the researcher to examine variation at different levels of society. Many
models still treat social data as if it were completely pooled, with no grouping within
groups. As Steenbergen and Jones (2002) note, this often has the effect of biasing
the standard errors, resulting in over-estimating the significance levels of variables.
Multilevel modeling can be thought of as a generalization of linear regression, wherein
either intercepts or slopes or both are allowed to vary by group (Gelman 2007).
Our dependent variable in this model is anti-immigrant sentiment. The first hypoth-
esis to be tested is that strong anti-immigrant cues from political parties will positively
influence anti-immigrant sentiment on the individual level. The next hypothesis to be
examined is the proposition that the presence of an extreme right-wing party will be
positively related to anti-immigrant sentiment at the country level, since right-wing
parties would be expected to introduce and maintain the issue in public debates. Fi-
nally, it is expected that exclusionary national identity will be positively related to
anti-immigrant sentiment at the individual level.
4.5 Conception and Measurement of Variables
For the measurement of anti-immigrant sentiment, the dependent variable, I use a ques-
tion from the ISSP that asks the respondents to agree or disagree with the statement
8I had initially run the analysis with expert data from the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, aware of
the potential problems with imputing party position backwards in time, but unaware of the existence
of the earlier Benoit and Laver survey. The results were substantially the same; however, the presence
of a right-wing party was not significant in the 2003 data but was significant with the 2006 data.
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“[Country]s government should take stronger measures to exclude immigrants.” In the
original survey, the scale ran from (1) “Strongly agree” to (5) “Strongly disagree.” I
recoded this variable so that higher scores reflect higher anti-immigrant sentiment (i.e.
so that a “5” score indicates the respondents strong agreement with this exclusionary
statement) and created a dummy variable wherein the respondents who strongly agreed
with this statement were coded 1 and all others, 0.
I measured the strength of a partys anti-immigrant cue by integrating the expert
means for each party in each country into the dataset. The experts surveyed by Benoit
and Laver were asked to place their party on a scale from (0) “Strongly opposes tough
immigration policy” to “Strongly favors tough immigration policy” (20). I collapsed
this to the more common ten-point scale. In terms of party strategy, as discussed
previously, parties of the far left and far right are more tightly clustered together than
parties of the center (as measured by the deviation from the mean). Parties of the
center-right family (Liberals, Conservatives, and Christian Democrats) had the most
variation within each family. The parties that scored the highest (above 8) on the scale
were unsurprising: the Front National and the UMF in France; Lijst Pim Fortuyn in
the Netherlands; the FP in Austria; True Finns in Finland; the Danish Peoples Party.
All have made the defense of national culture and identity central to their campaigns.
The opposite end of the scale was anchored by the Green parties across Europe, who
consistently scored between 1 and 2 on the scale, and socialist parties, who were about
the same. Social democratic parties tended to hover between 3 and 5, while Christian
democratic parties were between 6 and 8.
Drawing from the econometric tradition, political scientists long attributed anti-
immigrant sentiment to fear of increased competition for scarce resources: an economic
cost-benefit calculation in a zero-sum game. This literature draws primarily from anal-
yses of anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States (Citrin 1997) and, as McLaren
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(1996) points out, this relationship between economic standing and anti-immigrant
sentiment has not been replicated among the European public. Because the ISSP did
not standardize income measurements across countries (and reported only the median
income in local currency, not the distribution) I use their class measurement instead.
Respondents were asked to rank themselves on a bottom (1) to top (10) scale. Re-
sponses to this question were normally distributed; the majority of respondents ranked
themselves 5, 6, or 7.
Anti-immigrant sentiment can and does arise from perceived threats to symbolic in-
stitutions or “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991). In considering the relationship
of anti-immigrant sentiment and identity, I follow Hooghe and Marks (2005) distinction
between inclusionary and exclusionary forms of national identity. Inclusionary national
identity is adaptive and expansive, allowing for the importance of national identity
within the context of multiple sources of identity. Exclusionary national identity im-
plies the triumph of national identity at the expense of other forms of identity, based
on a comparative and relational system of judgment discussed elsewhere (Fox 2010).
Based on the factor loadings of another analysis of this dataset, I used the item with
the highest factor loading on (as I have termed it) patricentric identity, that is: “It
is very important to have [nationality] ancestry.” Originally scaled from 1 (“Strongly
Disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly Agree”) I recoded it as a dummy variable, whereby 1 stands
for strong agreement with this statement and 0 any lower level of agreement.
Education has consistently been shown to decrease negative attitudes towards im-
migrants and out-groups in general (Quillian 1995; Sniderman 2000; Kriesi et.al. 2008).
This could be the effect of education on its own, which by exposing people to different
cultures and ways of life increases understanding and tolerance (Bobo and Licari 1989;
Hiscox and Hainmueller 2007). It could also be that level of education coincides with
economic security, so that the well-educated are less pre-disposed to feel that their
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well-being is threatened by immigrants. The ISSP has country-specific measures of
education which are not directly comparable, but it also has a general question that
ranks the respondents level of education on a lowest-to-highest scale. Using the more
general question, I created a dummy variable whereby the highest level of education
achieved was coded 1, and the other levels, 0.9
Since de Vries and Edwards (2009) found that “extreme right-wing” parties10 influ-
enced the level of Euroskepticism at the national level, I hypothesized that the pres-
ence of an extreme right-wing party in a country would also increase the level of anti-
immigrant sentiment. Along with their defense of the national community against the
European Union, right-wing parties portray themselves as defenders of the national
community against the invasion of immigrants as well. The highly vocal and visible
presence of right-wing parties and politicians (for example, the current trial in the
Netherlands of Geert Wilders of the PVVthe party that rose to fill the gap after the
LPF collapsedfor defaming a minority population) has increased the salience of this
issue for all political parties. I operationalized as those which are more than one stan-
dard deviation away from the mean left-right position for each country. If a country
does not have such a party, it is coded 0. The same parties that scored the highest on
the anti-immigration scale above are the parties considered far right by this definition.
One structural variable considered, but ultimately not included in the model, is the
proportion of immigrants in each country: would a larger proportion of immigrants
result in increased attention to issues of immigration and/or a rise in exclusive national
9I also ran the analysis with all levels of education included rather than using the dummy variable.
The results were comparable.
10Extreme right-wing is the term de Vries and Edwards use. The naming and definition of parties
on the far right in Europe (extreme right, far right, new right, radical right) is actively contested. The
label chosen may indicate an underlying ontology: that these parties are neo-fascist (as extreme right
is used by Ignazi (1992), for example) or that the parties represent a new right movement which is
based on populist rhetoric and which works within the existing institutions (cf. radical rightin Givens
(2004, 2005)).
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identities? (Quillian 1995). Unfortunately, data on immigrant populations in Europe is
extremely difficult to parse. Countries vary considerably in their definition of immigrant
or “foreign” populations, and perception of immigrant population is notably unrelated
to absolute numbers of immigrants (Citrin et.al. 1997). Using the information available
through various sources (Eurostat and national statistics bureaus) I created a variable
that ranked each country as having a low, medium, or high proportion of immigrants.
This variable was not significant in any of the models in which it was included. This
finding is supported by Citrin and Sides (2008): comparing determinants of attitudes
towards immigrants in the United States and in Europe, they found that attitudes were
unaffected by the number and composition of the foreign born population (even though
respondents consistently overestimated the size of the foreign born population in their
own country).
Finally, at the individual level, demographic control variables were added: the re-
spondents sex (0 if male, 1 if female), and age. Including age controls for possible
generational effects, though it has been found that political attitudes fluctuate over the
course of a lifetime (Searing, Wright and Rabinowitz 1976; Krosnick 1988). I therefore
do not expect age to be an important variable. As for gender, electoral research in
the United States has found a distinct gender gap in levels of support for the Demo-
cratic party, suggesting that women hold more liberal attitudes than men (Wirls 1986;
Mueller 1988; Conover 1988). Givens (2004) found that men were more likely to vote
for radical right parties in Europe; though I believe the influence of sex will be slight, I
expect that women will have lower lever levels of anti-immigrant sentiment than men.
4.6 Analysis
Having defined variables of interest at each level, it is necessary to determine whether
there is significant variation in anti-immigrant sentiment at the party and individual
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levels. To confirm that there is (and that, therefore, a multi-level model is preferable
to a classical least squares estimation) an ANOVA is conducted on the anti-immigrant
sentiment indicator. Both individual and party level variance components are signif-
icant, providing evidence for variation at both levels. The ANOVA also allows for
the estimation of the ratio of the variance of each component to the total variation in
the data, that is, the relative importance of each level. Since this data is sampled at
the individual level, it is not surprising that most of the variance is explained at that
level (Snijders and Bosker 1999)–67.5 percent [1.026/(1.026 + 0.495*100]. 32.5 percent,
[0.494/(1.026 + 0.494) *100]) of explanatory variance is at the party level.
Table 4.2: Analysis of Variance
19
Table 2: ANOVA
Estimates
Fixed Effects
     Constant
   3.957**
(0.070)
Variance Components
     Party Level 0.495**
(0.052)
     Individual Level 1.026**
(0.086)
-2 x Log Likelihood 21019.71
**p<.001
Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses.
Source: ISSP 2003 data accessed through GESIS/ZACAT archive.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the fixed effects and the variance components
of the multi-level model are presented in Table 2. When the fitted model is compared
to the null model (Table 2 to Table 1) the chi-squared statistic shows that the fitted
model is a significant improvement over the null model: chi-squared=3973.92, df=7, p¡
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0.001. This indicates that some of the predictors included in the model have non-zero
values.
It is also possible to calculate the relative change in variance components between
the fitted model and the null model (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005). Individual-level
components are not impressive: the predictors explain only 1.6 [(1.026-1.01/1.026)*100]
percent of the variation in anti-immigrant sentiment. The predictors at the party-level
perform much better, accounting for 84% [(0.495-0.269/0.269)*100] of the cross-national
variance on anti-immigrant sentiment.11
There is evidence in support of several hypotheses in the model. The first vari-
able of interest, strength of party cue, was highly significant and positively related to
anti-immigrant sentiment (0.15). Partisan elites do affect those in their party on this
particular issue. There was no support for the corollary hypothesis that the presence of
a right-wing party was related to an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment. The variable
was statistically insignificant (at the 0.05 level) and the coefficient was in fact negative.
The model strongly supports the difference that level of education makes in levels of
anti-immigrant sentiment. Being highly educated decreased the level of anti-immigrant
sentiment substantially (-0.34) and the variable was highly significant. (This was true
whether the dummy variable for education was used or the original variable with all
values included.)
The measure for exclusionary national identity positively correlated with anti-immigrant
sentiment; this variable had the second-largest slope coefficient in the model (0.31) and
was highly significant. This continues to support the theory of the importance of
symbolic politics and the relationship between strong feelings of chauvinistic national
identity and negative predispositions toward out-groups.
The weak measure from the ISSP for class, which I appropriated as a measure of
11The “R-squared” for this model was 0.20
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Table 4.3: A Multilevel Model of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment
Determinants of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment
(Multi-Level Analysis)
Predictors   Estimates 
Fixed Effects
   Constant 3.179***
(0.126)
   Highly Educated -0.344***
(0.374)
   Class Self-Perception -0.015
(0.009)
   Exclusionary National Identity 0.305***
(0.034)
   Strength of Party Cue 0.150***
(0.018)
   Extreme Right-Wing Party -0.011
(0.092)
   Sex -0.061**
(0.027)
   Age 0.004***
(0.001)
Variance Components
   Party Level 0.269
(0.035)
   Individual Level 1.01
(0.009)
-2 x Log Likelihood 17045.692
      
N 5935
**p<.001, ***p<.0001
Sources: ISSP 2003 data,  accessed through the GESIS/ZACAT archive;
Benoit and Laver 2003 Party  Expert Survey.
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economic security, was not impressive: 0.01 coefficient value and not significant. If we
do believe in a correlation between being well-educated and higher levels of income, we
could see the education variable as a kind of proxy for a better income variable, but we
cannot tease out this relationship from this data. Finally, the demographic variables:
being female does slightly decrease levels of anti-immigrant sentiment (-0.07), and both
age and sex were significant, but with relatively negligible impact.
4.7 Concluding Discussion
This model contributes to the ongoing literature about the relationship of parties and
public as well as the study of the causes of anti-immigrant sentiment. In it, we see
the strong influence of party elites in cueing public attitudes, and we also find support
for two of the most common explanations of anti-immigrant sentiment: high levels of
exclusive national identity and lower levels of education contribute to a negative view
of immigrants. Only a decade ago, McLaren examined the differing attitudes toward
immigrants from E.U. member states and those from outside the E.U., arguing that
there was more elite discussion and debate on these issues in countries with high levels
of external (non-E.U.) immigration, and an absence of such elite debate in countries
with lower levels of external immigration (2001: 91). This difference seems to have
evaporated. Even in countries with fairly low levels of external immigration, party
elites considered this issue highly salient. The elite-level data used here foreshadows the
maneuvering that political parties have done since 2003 in order to define themselves
and to delineate their territory on this issue. The economic crisis in Europe will, I
believe, increase the appeal of political actors who provide simple, compelling narratives
of history, belonging, and identity.
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